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REMOVAL AND RETIREMENT OF JUDGES IN
MISSOURI: A FIELD STUDY
WILLIAM BRAITHWAITE*
I. INTRODUC"ION
On August 23, 1968, three days before his scheduled impeachment
trial, St. Louis County Circuit Judge John D. Hasler resigned. He had
previously been convicted by a juty of misconduct in office as a result
of his personal involvement with a woman divorce defendant in his
court.'
At the time of the Hasler incident, many Missourians undoubtedly
recalled another case involving a judge of the same court, Virgil A.
Poelker. Impeached in January 1963 on seventeen articles of miscon-
duct, Judge Poelker resigned five days before his trial and surrendered
to the state bar association his license to practice law.2
Considerably less well-known than the Poelker and Hasler cases-
because less sensational-is a datum reported in a March 1966 law re-
view article about a problem equally as urgent as judicial misconduct,
perhaps even more so. Approximately twenty Missouri judges, the
article said, have been induced to retire since 1955 by the Judicial Re-
tirement Committee of the state bar association, on the grounds of
illness, senility, or other disability.8
The problems dealt with by the Judicial Retirement Committee, the
Poelker and Hasler cases, and the conviction in May 1968 of former
Kansas City probate judge John Lodwick Jr. for federal income tax
evasion 4 are only the local manifestations of a nation-wide problem
that compels increasing attention: what to do about the judge who is
unable or unwilling to carry out properly the duties of his office. Prob-
lems of judicial fitness (or unfitness if you will) certainly are not
peculiar to Missouri, or any other particular jurisdiction. Consider the
* Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation, Chicago. The research on which this
article is based was supported by the American Bar Foundation, but the article is en-
tirely the responsibility of its author.
1. Chicago Sun-Times, July 14, 1968, at 7, col. 1.
2. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Mar. 14, 1963, at 1, col. 7.
3. Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and Discipline of Judges,
41 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 149, 166 (1966).
4. Kansas City Times, May 30, 1968, at 9.
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following cases, drawn from those reported in the public press during
the past two or three years.
When a judgeship in Love County, Oklahoma fell vacant a few years
ago, no one could be found who wanted the job. So the state supreme
court, at the request of two local district judges, gave Joe Thompson a
special permit to fill the office-until he passed the bar examination.
He passed on the fourth try, or maybe it was the third, he's not certain
which.5
Benjamin A. Schor, a Queens County (Long Island), New York
criminal court judge, retired in January 1967 after being indicted for
grand larceny and conspiracy to obstruct justice as a result of his alleged
involvement in the $3,500 shake-down of an applicant for a state liquor
license. These indictments were subsequently dismissed for insufficient
evidence by Queens County Supreme Court Justice Irwin Shapiro, who
commented in his opinion that Schor had committed "transparent
perjury" in his testimony to the grand jury. Schor has been indicted
on nine counts of perjury and will be tried sometime in the fall of
1968.6
Chicago judges Louis W. Kizas and James E. Murphy were suspended
from office by Chief Judge John S. Boyle in May 1967 after an investi-
gation of their bond-writing activities revealed they had written an
unusually high number of bonds. Kizas resigned and was later indicted
on charges of bribery and official misconduct. He has not yet been
tried. Murphy was cleared of wrongdoing, and misconduct charges
against him dismissed by the Illinois Courts Commission.'
Lexington, Virginia judge William M. A. Romans Jr. was convicted
in May 1968 of seventeen counts of forgery and obtaining money under
false pretenses. He is now serving a four-year term in the Virginia State
Penitentiary. In a hand-printed statement signed by him and filed in
the trial court at Lexington, Romans said he "does not desire to offer,
and in fact does not have any, defense" to disbarment proceedings
against him by the state bar association.8
In the public press, from which the foregoing cases are drawn, little
mention is made of instances of judicial unfitness besides misconduct.
5. Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 12, 1967, at 14, col. 1.
6. New York Times, Jan. 5, 1967, at 14, col. 6; letter from Frederick J. Ludwig, Chief
Assistant District Attorney, Queens County, New York, to William Braithwaite, Aug. 1,
1968.
7. Chicago Sun-Times, May 12, 1967, at 1, col. 1 (four star ed.); Chicago Daily News,
Nov. 3, 1967, at 9, col. 1; Chicago Sun-Times, June 11, 1968, at 2, col. 1.
8. Roanoke (Va.) World-News, June 21, 1968.
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But there is evidence that other problems, such as judicial disability,
may also occur in some jurisdictions. Reference to the disability prob-
lem in Missouri has already been made.9 In California, the Commission
on Judicial Qualifications stated in its 1963 report to the governor
that among the ten judges who had resigned or retired that year during
investigation by the commission, the "most common difficulties" were
"[d]isabling illness with incapacity to perform judicial duties" and
"weakening of mental faculties connected with advanced age and re-
flected in unacceptable derelictions in court."' 10
In the past, problems of judicial misconduct and disability were
supposed to be dealt with by the traditional common-law procedures
of impeachment (forty-six states), address (twenty-eight states), or recall
(seven states).'1 Impeachment is a legislative proceeding, in which the
lower house acts as grand jury and the upper house sits as a court for
trial of the charges. Address is a formal request by both houses of a
legislature to the governor asking him to remove a judge; in some
states, legislative vote alone is sufficient, the governor's participation
being unnecessary. Recall is analogous to initiative and referendum; if
a certain percentage of the voters sign a petition to recall a judge, he
must face a special election. In some states, he runs unopposed and
remains in office if he wins a majority of the votes cast; in other states,
he may be opposed and the candidate with the most votes wins the
office.
However much used in the past (there is no reliable evidence on the
point), the traditional procedures are today obsolete, 12 because cum-
bersome and inadequate; and as a consequence the problems of judicial
unfitness have recently attracted fresh thought. The primary impetus
for a new look at removal and retirement of judges probably has been
9. See note 3 and accompanying text.
10. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 2
(1963).
11. AME-ICAN JUDICATURE SOcIETY, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 1-3 (Rep. No. 5,
April 1968) (also containing a brief explanation of the procedures and an up-to.date
though not comprehensive bibliography).
12. It is reasonable to surmise that address and recall have been used hardly at all.
Impeachment is still used occasionally. Recent examples from the states: Miami trial
judge George E. Holt was impeached but acquitted in 1957; St. Louis County trial judge
Virgil A. Poelker was impeached but resigned shortly before his trial in 1963; Oklahoma
Supreme Court judge N.B. Johnson was impeached and convicted in 1964 while Earl
Welch, a colleague impeached in the same case, resigned before trial; St. Louis County
trial judge John D. Hasler was impeached in 1968 but resigned three days before his
scheduled trial. The last impeachment of a federal judge was in 1936 (Halstead L. Ritter,
Southern District of Florida, convicted).
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the publicity given to California's Commission on Judicial Qualifica-
tions.'3 Created by constitutional amendment in 1960, the nine-member
commission is empowered to receive and investigate complaints from
any source about judges, and to recommend to the state supreme court
that the court remove, censure, or retire a judge. As a result of the
commission's apparent success,14 procedures modeled after it have been
adopted in eight states and are being considered in nine more. 15
Attentive to the concern evinced by this widespread emulation of
the California plan, the American Bar Association decided at its 1965
annual meeting to initiate a general study of judicial removal, discipline,
and retirement. 6 The American Bar Foundation, independent research
affiliate of the ABA, agreed to do the research, which began in April
1966. As subsequently developed, the plan for research called for field
studies in Missouri, Illinois, New York, New Jersey, and California.
The purpose of the field studies was to learn how these jurisdictions
deal in actual practice with the problems of judicial misconduct,
disability, and incompetence. This article is based upon the research
in Missouri, the first field study to be completed.'7
II. DEVELOPMENT AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH PLAN
The initial tasks of research were to study the reported cases, ex-
amine the law, and evaluate the literature. The most interesting finding
13. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8. See also CAL. CT. R. 901-921.
14. In the first seven years of the commission's operation, forty-four judges resigned
or retired during investigation of their performance or conduct. CALrPoRnxA CoMMSSION
ON JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS, REPORTS TO THE GOVERNOR (1961-67). The commission's opera-
tions and procedure are described in detail in articles by its executive secretary, Jack E.
Frankel, e.g., Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 TEx. L. Rav. 1117 (1966); Judicial Re-
tirement, Discipline and Removal: The California Plan, 27 TEx. BJ. 791 (1964); Removal
of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem, 49 A.B.A.J. 166 (1963).
15. Procedures similar to the California commission have been adopted in Colorado,
Florida, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. A variation
of the California procedure exists in Vermont. States considering adoption of a California-
type procedure are Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota,
Oregon, and Utah. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 3
(Rep. No. 5, April 1968).
16. The initiating resolution called for "a comprehensive study of the problems re-
lating to the aged, the ill or the otherwise infirm justice or judge or the justice or judge
who for other reasons is not carrying out his judicial responsibilities." 90 A.B.A. REP.
338 (1965). The resolution was sponsored jointly by the Section of Judicial Administra-
tion and the Standing Committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure and Compensation.
17. As already noted, however, supra, preceding note 1, this article, while the result
of research sponsored and supported financially by the American Bar Foundation, is
entirely the responsibility of its author alone.
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in the study of cases was the variety of circumstances that have raised
the question of a judge's qualification to continue in office. Within the
past ten years, for example, judges have been charged with nearly every
variety of misconduct, from major felonies, e.g., involuntary man-
slaughter,"' bribery,19 embezzlement,20 forgery,21 and grand larceny,2
18. Judge Wayne W. Olson, of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Chicago), was
charged with involuntary manslaughter, and thereupon immediately suspended from
duty by the Chief Judge, as a result of the death of Lawrence Benner. Benner received
a fatal skull fracture when he fell during a 4:00 a.m. scuffle outside the Alibi Inn, a
suburban tavern where Olson, by his own admission, had been drinking with Benner,
whom the coroner ruled was intoxicated at the time of death. Olson claimed his "po-
litical discussion" with Benner was friendly throughout, and that he never touched
Benner. The grand jury did not indict. Citing this fact as an indication that there was in-
sufficient evidence to warrant a hearing, the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court
declined to convene the Illinois Courts Commission to hear the case. Olson's suspension
was then terminated, he returned to duty, and is still in office. Chicago Daily News,
Sept. 22, 1964, at 1, col. 1; Sept. 23, at 1, col. 6; Sept. 24, at 3, col. 1; Sept. 26, at 3, col. 4;
Jan. 13, 1965, at 15, col. 1; Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 14, 1965, at 22, col. I (three star ed.);
Jan. 23, at 36, col. 1 (four star ed.). See also Editorial, 48 J. Am. Jim. Soc'y 164 (1965);
Boodell, What Court Reform Can Do For You-Improving the Image of the Judge, the
Lawyer, and the Organized Bar, 49 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 133, 142 (1965). Regarding the Illi-
nois Courts Commission, its jurisdiction and powers, see ILL. CONsr. art. VI, § 18 and
ILL. Sup. CT. R. 51(b).
19. A bribery scandal on the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1964 got national publicity.
Judge N.S. Corn admitted taking a $150,000 bribe in a 1957 tax case and sharing it with
Judges Earl Welch and N.B. Johnson. Corn and Welch resigned; Johnson was impeached
and convicted. New York Times, Nov. 14, 1964, at 14, col. 6; Mar. 23, 1965, at 30, col. 5;
May 14, 1965, at 40, col. 1.
An investigation of the Philadelphia magistrate courts by the Pennsylvania Attorney
General in 1965 concluded there was "widespread corruption at every level of the magis-
terial system." OFFICE oF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSYLVANIA, REPORT ON TME IN-
VESTIGATION OF THE MAGISTERIAL SYSMs 9 (1965). More recently (November, 1967), a
Chicago judge, Louis W. Kizas, was indicted for bribery and official misconduct on the
basis of allegations that he took payoffs from lawyers and defendants in an illegal bail
bond scheme. Kizas has resigned from the bench but draws $600 a month pension (which
he will lose, however, if convicted on the bribery indictment). Chicago Sun-Times, May
12, 1967, at 1, col. 1; May 26, at 1, col. I (four star ed.); Chicago Daily News, Sept. 16,
1967, at 2, col. 1; Nov. 3, at 9, col. 2.
20. John Lodwick, Jr., probate judge of Clay County, Mo. (north suburban Kansas
City), was indicted in March 1966 on seven counts of embezzlement which charged that
he took $2,812 in court fines he levied during 1961 while a town magistrate. North Kansas
City (Mo.) News-Dispatch, Mar. 14, 1966, at 1. He has not yet been tried.
21. See note 8, supra, and accompanying text.
22. Indictments charging attempted grand larceny, conspiracy to commit grand lar-
ceny, and conspiracy to obstruct justice were returned against New York City Criminal
Court Judge Benjamin A. Schor in November 1966. It was alleged Schor was involved in
the shakedown for $3,500 of an applicant for a state liquor license. A week after his in-
dictment, Schor fied for retirement. Subsequently, the indictment was dismissed by the
trial court for "insufficient evidence," the court commenting that Schor had committed
"transparent perjury" in his testimony to the grand jury. Schor's retirement was effective
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to comparatively less serious offenses involving only a breach of some
canon of judicial ethics, e.g., running for another public office while a
judge23 or otherwise participating in partisan politics, 24 accepting gifts
and favors from lawyers practicing before them,25 being abusive and
discourteous to persons appearing in court,26 unduly delaying the trial
and decision of cases, 27 and engaging in favoritism in official appoint-
ments.
2 8
January 4, 1967. New York Times, Nov. 5, 1966, at 1, col. 8; Dec. 14, at 1, col. 1; Jan. 5,
1967, at 14, col. 6. Following dismissal of the larceny and conspiracy indictments, Schor
was indicted on nine counts of perjury. He will be tried sometime in the fall of 1968.
Letter from Frederick J. Ludwig, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Queens County, New
York, to William Braithwaite, August 1, 1968.
23. E.g., Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958)
(Youngstown municipal court judge carried on active public campaign for city prose-
cutor). After suspending Judge Franko indefinitely from membership in the bar, the
state supreme court ruled that suspension worked a forfeiture of the judicial office and
the judge could be removed by quo warranto. State ex Tel. Saxbe v. Franko, 168 Ohio
St. 338, 154 N.E.2d 751 (1958). Cf. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHics
28 & 30, which generally proscribe political activity.
24. E.g., In re Pagliughi, 39 N.J. 517, 189 A.2d 218 (1963) (judge was Republican ward
leader, active in Young Republicans Club, attended political dinners, and allowed home
to be used for voter registration); In re Hayden, 41 N.J. 443, 197 A.2d 353 (1964) (judge
wrote political announcement, which was publicly circulated, for former client). As to
political actiity by judges in New Jersey, see N.J. CT. R. 1:25 & 8:13-7(a).
25. This was one of several charges in articles of impeachment voted May 27, 1957
against George E. Holt, a Miami circuit judge. He was acquitted after a month-long
trial. New York Times, July 23, 1957, at 12, col. 3; Aug. 17, 1957, at 16, col. I. AMEmRCAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF JUDIcIAL ETICS 32, provides:
A judge should not accept any presents or favors from litigants, or from lawyers
practicing before him ...
26. The Appellate Division of New York's Second Department removed Long Island
Judge Floyd Sarisohn in May 1967, after finding him guilty on six of ten specifications
charging official misconduct, including use of "intemperate and abusive language" in
court. New York Times, May 16, 1967, at 1, col. 5. The Iowa Supreme Court in Septem-
ber 1964, admonished two Cedar Rapids municipal court judges for handling court
business "according to their personal whims and predilections" and "oppressive and un-
just uce" of the powers of their courts. In re Judges of the Municipal Court of the City
of Cedar Rapids, 256 Iowa 1135, 130 N.W.2d 553 (1964). Cf. AmERICuN BAR ASSOCIATION,
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 10.
27. See In re Judges of the Municipal Court of the City of Cedar Rapids, supra, note
26. Cf. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF JuDIcIAL ETHICS 7 ("A judge should be
prompt in the performance of his judicial duties . . .') and 18 ("A judge . .. [should]
enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before the court.")
28. The Oregon Supreme Court in 1965 denied a probate judge's request for a writ of
prohibition to thwart disciplinary proceedings against him based upon his appointment
of his wife as appraiser of an estate. Jenkins v. Oregon State Bar, 241 Ore. 283, 405 P.2d
525 (1965). During the investigation that followed the indictment for embezzlement of
Missouri probate judge John Lodwick Jr. (see note 20, supra), it was discovered he once
appointed his father inheritance tax appraiser for an estate valued at $935,000; the father
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1968/iss3/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Not unexpectedly, the news media have given most attention to those
incidents involving serious or sensational misconduct. But other prob-
lems may be just as urgent. One of them is lack of professional legal
ability. Columbia law professor Maurice Rosenberg, a member of the
New York City Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary, argues:
29
Avoiding a catastrophic choice [in selecting judges] is essential,
but it is not enough. A judge need not be vicious, corrupt, or
witless to be a menace in office. Mediocrity can be in the long run
as bad a pollutant as venality, for it dampens opposition and is
more likely to be tolerated. Judicial office today demands the best
possible men, not those of merely average ability who were gray
and undistinguished as lawyers and who will be just as drab as
judges.
Another problem is that presented by the judge who because of age or
illness becomes unable to do his job. California has reported such
difficulties; they have been a recurring problem in Missouri.80 Un-
doubtedly, other jurisdictions have been troubled as well with this
distressing situation.
Specific instances of unfit judges fall into one of three classes of
problems: incompetence, involving lack of professional job skills; mis-
conduct, involving failure to satisfy community standards of judicial
deportment (private and public); and disability, involving any dis-
qualifying condition related to health, whether physical, mental, or
emotional.
American jurisdictions have dealt with the problems of incompetence,
misconduct, and disability in various ways. All jurisdictions have one
or more of the traditional procedures of impeachment, address, and
recall. Many of them have other procedures as well, evidence of the
felt ineffectiveness of the traditional remedies. The principal "modern"
procedures are the widely copied California commission plan already
mentioned,3 1 which is best-known, and the court on the judiciary. This
latter procedure, originally adopted in New York in 1947,32 operates
through a court specially constituted for the sole purpose of deciding
received a $1,000 fee. North Kansas City (Mo.) News-Dispatch, Apr. 7, 1966, at 1. Mamra-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF JuDICIAL ETHics 12, provides: "[A judge] should also
avoid nepotism and undue favoritism in his appointments."
29. Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justice-Are They Strainable?, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1063,
1064 (1966).
30. See notes 3 & 10 supra, and accompanying text.
31. See notes, 13-15 supra, and accompanying text.
82. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 22.
Washington University Open Scholarship
REMOVAL OF JUDGES
cases of judicial misconduct and disability. Eleven states33 have a
procedure of this type. A hybrid procedure with characteristics of both
the commission and the court on the judiciary is the special retirement
procedures that exist in five states34 only for cases of disability. Finally,
a few states, e.g., New Jersey35 and Ohio,36 have dealt with judicial
misconduct by use of the state supreme court's disciplinary power over
judges as members of the bar.
One's evaluation of the literature on the subject, which is modest
in amount, depends upon what one is looking for. Of approximately
110 relevant articles listed in the volumes of the Index to Legal
Periodicals covering 1866-1966, sixty are about the traditional proce-
dures, mainly impeachment. Taken together, these sixty articles contain
a full discussion of the doctrinal aspects of the law of impeachment.
The remaining fifty articles are on various subjects, doctrinal and
historical. If concern is addressed, however, not to legal doctrine but
to the practical operation of removal-retirement procedures today, none
of the law review literature before 1960 is useful or even relevant.
The literature since 1960 falls into three classes. One is the spate of
articles provoked by the Chandler incident.37 These mostly concern
the constitutional issues involved in removal or retirement of federal
judges and are therefore not informative about any practical aspects of
33. Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCiEry, JUDICIAL DISCIPNE AND
REMOVAL 2 (Rep. No. 5, April 1968). (New Jersey does not have a court on the judiciary
and is therefore erroneously included in the list in Rep. No. 5).
34. Alaska, Hawaii, Missouri, New Jersey, and Oregon. Id. at 3.
35. See In re Pagliughi, 39 N.J. 517, 189 A.2d 218 (1963) and In re Mattera, 34 N.J.
259, 168 A.2d 38 (1961).
36. See State ex rel. Saxbe v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 338, 154 N.E.2d 751 (1958) and
Mahoning County Bar Ass'n v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958).
37. Stephen S. Chandler, Chief Judge of the Western District of Oklahoma, was found
by the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council in December 1965 to be "unable or unwilling
to discharge efficiently the duties of his office" and thereupon ordered by the Council to
"take no action whatsoever in any case or proceeding now or hereafter pending" before
him. See Misc. Order No. 1111, Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the
United States, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966). After a month of wrangling and an abortive appeal
by the judge to the Supreme Court, he and the Council reached accord. New York Times,
Feb. 8, 1966, at 27, col. 1. The incident provoked a flurry of comment in the law reviews,
mostly about the constitutional issues involved. The Chandler Incident and Problems of
Judicial Removal, 19 STAN. L. REv. 448 (1967); Removal of Federal Judges-Alternatives
to Impeachment, 20 VAND. L. REv. 723 (1967); 21 RuT. L. RMv. 153 (1966); 41 ST. JoHN'S
L. Rrv. 97 (1966); 20 Sw. L.J. 667 (1966); U.C.L.A.L. R-v. 1385 (1966). See also Kramer &
Barron, The Constitutionality of Removal and Mandatory Retirement Procedures for
the Federal Judiciary: The Meaning of "During Good Behavior", 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
455 (1967).
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the problem. A second class is one 1966 article by two New York
University law students,38 the only thing to date based upon an attempt
at empirical research. The third class is the writings of Jack E. Frankel,
whose articles39 are valuable-one should say invaluable-because he is
the only person who writes from experience. He has been executive
secretary of the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications since
its creation in 1960 and personally processes every complaint addressed
to that agency, an average of about ninety each year. Although it is
the nine-member commission itself which decides what action to take
in each case, for purposes of day-to-day administration, Frankel is the
commission. Clearly he knows whereof he writes.
The student article is a result of research funded by the Institute of
Judicial Administration at New York University School of Law and is
based upon interviews with "judges, lawyers, court administrators, law
professors, and laymen" in California, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
and Wisconsin. While limited in depth and sophistication at some
points, it nevertheless has the distinction of representing the first con-
scientious effort to find out what is actually happening.
The student article and Frankel's writings provided the initial
inspiration for the plan of the present research. As eventually developed,
the plan called for field studies in Missouri, Illinois, New York, New
Jersey, and California, whose removal-retirement procedures differ
significantly in their formal characteristics. The method of research
was to collect "case histories," using as sources public and private
records and interviews with people who had been involved in the situa-
tions. The immediate aim was to develop an accurate description of
the practical operation of different procedures. A broader purpose was
to identify the functional similarities and differences among different
procedures, in order to see what generalizations might be made about
the best way to deal with the problems of judicial misconduct, incom-
petence, and disability.
38. Note, Remedies for Judicial Misconduct and Disability: Removal and Discipline of
Judges, 41 N.Y.U.L. RIv. 149 (1966).
39. Frankel's articles include: Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem,
49 A.B.A.J. 166 (1963); Discipline and Removal of Judges, 88 FLA. 3.J. 1088 (1964); Re-
moval of Judges-Federal and State, 48 J. Am!. JUD. Soc'Y 177 (1965); The Case for Judi-
cial Disciplinary Measures, 49 J. Am. Jun. Soc'v 218 (1966); Judicial Misconduct and
Removal of Judges for Cause in California, 86 So. CAL. L. REv. 72 (1962); Judicial Re-
tirement, Discipline and Removal: The California Plan, 27 Tax. BJ. 791 (1964); Judicial
Discipline and Removal, 44 T:x. L. Rav. 1117 (1966).
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III. Ta RESEARCH IN MISSOURI
To keep the Missouri research within manageable limits, we decided
to focus mainly, though not exclusively, on one city, St. Louis. The
aim was to learn how the state's removal and retirement procedures
have been implemented in that city. Since it turned out, however, that
no judge in St. Louis had been charged with misconduct during the
period covered by the research, it was necessary to go beyond the city
to learn about Missouri's use of its removal procedure (impeachment).
Thus, St. Louis became a point of reference rather than a limitation
on the subject-matter. (The trial court for St. Louis County, where two
judges have been impeached since 1963, is separate from the trial court
for St. Louis City. To clarify this distinction in this article, "St. Louis"
is used to refer to the city; if the reference is to the county, the word
county is used.)
Preliminary investigation into the problems of disability and mis-
conduct in St. Louis revealed that (a) eight judges had left office since
1953 because of disability, (b) no judge had been removed or disciplined
for misconduct or incompetence since at least 1950. The first finding
suggested an inquiry into the workings of the retirement procedure.
Two agencies are involved: the Committee on Retirement of Judges
and Magistrates, consisting of nine judges, and the state bar associa-
tion's Judicial Retirement Committee, consisting of seven lawyers
(increased from five in 1963). Actual authority to retire a judge for
disability is in the committee of judges. The bar committee theoretically
is only a mechanism to activate the committee of judges, which does
not initiate proceedings on its own motion. The bar committee either
seeks to induce disabled judges to apply voluntarily for a hearing before
the judges' committee, or acts as complaining witness when this ap-
proach fails (which is seldom). The operations of these two committees
were studied through the use of certain confidential records, supple-
mented by corroborating information from the two sources mentioned
in the next paragraph.
The second finding of the preliminary investigation, that no St.
Louis judge has been removed or disciplined for misconduct or incom-
petence since at least 1950, suggested the need to inquire whether
there had been incidents of misconduct or incompetence which for some
reason had not resulted in action by the legal community. Two sources
of information were used in this inquiry: interviews with a selected
group of lawyers and judges; and local newspaper files.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1968/iss3/2
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The principal purpose of the interviews was to discover whether
there had been any incidents of judicial misconduct or incompetence
which should have provoked some action but did not. The best source
of such information is trial practitioners, since they have the most
direct, frequent, and regular contact with judges. A list of ten trial
lawyers whose experience and age had given them opportunity for
first-hand knowledge of the character of the local trial judiciary was
drawn up by David L. Millar of St. Louis. Millar is a former president
of the state bar association and was chairman for twelve years (until
1966) of the association's Judicial Retirement Committee, which was
instrumental in effecting the retirement or resignation of seven of the
eight disabled judges in St. Louis.
All the ten lawyers, whose ages ranged from forty-two to sixty-five,
had extensive trial experience. They came from small firms, solo
practice, and large firms (ten partners is large by St. Louis standards).
Besides the lawyers, three judges, also suggested by Millar, and two
newspaper reporters were interviewed. One of the judges has been on
the bench over twenty years, the other two over ten years each. Both
reporters have covered the local courts for a number of years. These
fifteen persons were selected because they were in positions to have
direct, reliable knowledge of any serious incidents of judicial miscon-
duct or incompetence which might have occurred. It was not to be
expected that there would have been many such incidents, since the
St. Louis trial judiciary is small (twenty judges), has a low rate of turn-
over (only seventeen judgeships vacated and filled in twenty-five years,
1941-66), and is well regarded by the legal community.
The interviews were loosely structured around four main questions:
(1) What incidents do you know about where a judge's performance or
conduct could have been called into question? (2) What were the cir-
cumstances of each such case? (3) What action was taken and by whom?
(4) If no action was taken, why not, in your opinion? Discussion of
these questions was supplemented by additional, "open-ended" ques-
tions appropriate to the character of information which the particular
respondent had.
Both major St. Louis papers, the Globe-Democrat (morning) and the
Post-Dispatch (evening), have long-established reputations as watch-dogs
of local government. Thus it could be supposed that any serious in-
cident of judicial misconduct or incompetence would have been re-
ported in the newspapers. The files of the Globe-Democrat were used
to check the news clippings on every judge who has been on the circuit
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(trial) bench since 1940. In some cases, the newspaper files provided
leads that were then checked with other sources; in other cases, the
newspaper stories corroborated information acquired elsewhere.
For further information about Missouri's response to the problem
of judicial misconduct, a case history was developed for each of three
cases that have occurred outside St. Louis in the last five years.
IV. MIssouRI'S COURT SYSTEM
A brief description of the state's court system will place the problems
of judicial incompetence, misconduct, and disability in their institu-
tional context. Missouri's courts are arranged in the conventional four-
tier structure shown in Table 1. There are minor courts, circuit courts
(trial courts of general jurisdiction), and two levels of appellate courts.
A total of 277 judges staff these courts. The supreme court is con-
stitutionally granted "general supervisory control" over all lower courts
but exercises this control moderately. Statistical reports from lower
courts, for example, are required only annually, rather than quarterly
or monthly as in some states. The limited character of the supreme
court's administrative supervision may be partly a result of the pre-
dominantly rural geography of the state. Thirty-five of the forty-three
circuits into which the state is divided have only one judge, five others,
only two or three judges. Half the state's four and a quarter million
people live in the two urban areas, St. Louis and Kansas City. The
trial courts in these two cities include thirty-five of the state's ninety-
seven trial judges and are largely independent of the supreme court
administratively.
The trial court of the twenty-second circuit, St. Louis, has twenty
divisions, each presided over by one judge. There are eleven civil
litigation divisions, one of which handles assignment of cases; two
divisions each for equity and domestic relations; and five divisions for
criminal cases, one of which handles assignment of cases. Judges are
assigned to the divisions for one-year terms by the court en banc, and
with few exceptions each judge rotates assignment regularly. The
presiding judgeship, mainly an administrative position, is also rotated
yearly.
The state uses two methods of judicial selection. All appellate judges,
trial judges in the St. Louis and Kansas City circuits, and certain minor
court judges in these two circuits are selected by the so-called Missouri
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TABLE 1
MISSOURI COURT SYSTEM
SUPREME COURT
7 Missouri Plan* judges
12-year terms
Retirement mandatory at 75
COURTS OF APPEAL
9 Missouri Plan* judges
12-year terms
Retirement mandatory at 75
St. Louis
Court of Appeals
3 judges
Kansas City
Court of Appeals
3 judges
Springfield
Court of Appeals
3 judges
St. Louis
(Circuit 22)
20 Missouri
Plan* judges
CIRCUIT COURTS
(trial court of general jurisdiction)
43 circuits
97 judges
6-year terms
No mandatory retirement
Kansas City
(Circuit 16)
15 Missouri
Plan* judges
Probate Courts
One court of one judge
in each of 115 counties.
Elected; 4-year terms.
MINOR COURTS
Magistrate Courts
One in each of 115 coun-
ties. County of pop. 30,000
or less, probate judge is
also magistrate. Over 30,000
-- one or more magistrates,
varies with population.
Elected; 4-year terms.
St. Louis Court of
Criminal Correction
Two Missouri
Plan judges
* See text, part IV.
plan,40 whereby judicial appointments are made by the governor from
a panel of three candidates nominated for each vacancy by a commission
40. The procedure is so called because Missouri is the state in which it was first adopted
(in 1940). The procedure is also called, variously, the American Bar Association plan,
non-partisan court plan, and merit plan. The basic provisions of law are Mo. CONST. art.
V, § 29 and Mo. Sup. CT. R. 10.
All Other
Circuits
Judges
elected
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of judges, lawyers, and laymen. Circuit judges, probate judges, and
magistrates in the forty-one circuits outside St. Louis and Kansas City
are chosen by partisan election. Appellate judges' terms are twelve
years; circuit judges', six; probate judges' and magistrates', four.
After an initial term of one to two years-it varies depending upon
the date of appointment-the Missouri plan judge seeks a full term by
filing a declaration of candidacy to succeed himself. He then runs
unopposed, without party designation, on a ballot saying: Shall Judge
X be retained in office? If a majority of those voting on the question
vote affirmatively, the judge is retained. Successive terms are sought
in a similar manner. Elected judges run for additional terms on a
partisan ballot and may be opposed.
St. Louis and Kansas City each have a five-member commission to
nominate circuit judges under the Missouri plan. The presiding judge
of the court of appeals district encompassing the circuit is chairman;
the lawyers residing in the circuit elect two of their number; and the
governor appoints two citizens (non-lawyers) from among the residents
of the circuit. The composition and selection of the commission that
nominates appellate judges is similar except that it has seven members
and they are chosen on a state-wide basis. The chief justice of the
supreme court is chairman of the appellate nominating commission.
In the first twenty-six years the Missouri plan was in effect (through
1966), six governors appointed seventy-two judges.41 By the end of 1966,
in Kansas City, fourteen of the fifteen trial judges were Missouri plan
judges; in St. Louis, fifteen of twenty. All but one of the sixteen appel-
late judges were Missouri plan judges.
A substantial body of literature about the plan has been produced,42
41. This total includes twelve supreme court judges, sixteen intermediate appellate
court judges, twenty-one Kansas City trial judges, nineteen St. Louis trial judges, and
four judges of courts with limited jurisdiction in these two cities.
42. Many of the articles favoring the plan have appeared in the JOURNAL or THE
AMERICAN JUDsCATutRE SOC=rTY. One principal activity of the society is to promote the
plan. 46 J. AM. JuD. Soc'" 167-224 (Feb. 1963) includes a cumulative index of the issues
from 1937 to 1962. Articles on the Missouri plan are listed at 192-94. Other recent articles
favoring the plan include: Hall, Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan: A Quarter Century
Review, 33 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 163 (1965); Medalie, Judicial Selection: The First Na-
tional Conference on Judicial Selection and Its Implications for Massachusetts, 4 Bos'roN
B.J. 13 (1960); Niles, The Changing Politics of Judicial Selection: A Merit Plan for New
York, 22 Rrcoan OF N.Y.C.B.A. 242 (1967); O'Connell & Means, Should Judges Be Selected
by Merit Plan?, 40 FLA. B.J. 1146 (1966); Roberts, Twenty-Five Years under the Missouri
Plan, 3 GA. S.B.J. 185 (1966); Schrader, Judicial Selection: Taking the Courts out of
Politic , 46 A.B.A.J. 1115 (1960); Sneed, Proposed Judicial Article for Oklahoma, 36 OKLA.
B.A.J. 2218 (1965); Van Osdol, Politics and judicial Selection, 28 AI.A, LAWYER 167 (1967);
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most of it favorable. Nearly all the commentary, pro and con, has be-
come stereotyped and dogmatic, however. The plan, it is said, selects
"better" judges and "takes judges out of politics." Out of party politics
and into "bar politics," opponents rejoin. Opponents also charge that
the plan is "undemocratic" because it "usurps the right of the people
to choose who will govern them." Some comment is frenetic: "the
Nazi court scheme," "Fascism's entering wedge in America."" Some
is evangelical: "the greatest single event of this century in the field of
judicial administration." 44
The discussion may proceed at a less impassioned level after the
publication (scheduled for early 1969) of The Politics of the Bench and
Bar: Judicial Selection under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan,4"
which reports the findings of a four-year study of the Missouri plan.
Conducted by a University of Missouri political scientist, Richard A.
Watson, and two of his colleagues, the study aimed mainly to find out
how the Missouri plan actually does operate and whether, in the
opinion of lawyers practicing before them, Missouri plan judges are
"better."
Professor Watson and his colleagues used a variety of research tech-
niques, beginning with a study of historical materials including news-
paper reports and conventional legal literature. With this background,
they conducted about 250 interviews with judges, lawyers, and political
figures in order to get information on individual judicial appointments.
On the basis of the interviews, a questionnaire was developed, which
was intended to reveal the attitudes of a random sample of lawyers
Winters, Judicial Reform from Coast to Coast, 2 TULSA L.J. 115 (1965). The opposition
literature includes: Moran, Counter-Missouri Plan for Method of Selecting Judges, 82
FLA. B.J. 471 (1958); Spence, Should Judges Be Selected by Merit Plan?, 40 FLA. B.J. 1146,
1147 (1966); Tate, As They Say in Missouri, 12 LA. B.J. 25 (1964); Wormuth & Rich,
Politics, the Bar and the Selection of Judges, 3 UTAH L. Rav. 459 (1953).
43. 6 BENCH & BAR 2 (1942).
44. Address by Glenn R. Winters, Executive Director of the American Judicature So-
ciety, Lawyers' Association of Kansas City Meeting, April 8, 1964, in Watson, Lawyer
Attitudes on Judicial Selection, 72 AM. J. Soc. 373, 375 at n. 14 (1967).
45. R. -WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION
UNDER THE MISSOURI NON-PARTISAN COURT PLAN (unpublished). I am happy to acknowl-
edge the gracious assistance of Dr. Richard A. Watson of the Department of Political
Science at the University of Missouri, for his making available, before publication, some
of the results of his work which were relevant to this research. Three articles have been
published in advance of the full-length work: Watson, Missouri Lawyers Evaluate the
Merit Plan for Selection and Tenure of Judges, 52 A.B.A.J. 539 (1966); Watson, Lawyer
Attitudes on Judicial Selection, 72 Am. J. Soc. 373 (1967); Watson, Downing, and Speigel,
Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests, 61 Am. POL.
Scr. REv. 54 (1967).
Washington University Open Scholarship
REMOVAL OF JUDGES
about the Missouri plan and the lawyers' evaluation of judges selected
under it. Using information from The 1964 Lawyer Statistical Report,
Professor Watson and his colleagues concluded that the 1,233 lawyers
who responded to their questionnaire were statistically representative
of the 6,606 members of the Missouri state bar. (By law, all lawyers
practicing in Missouri are members of the state bar.) Among the con-
clusions of the Watson study most relevant to the present research are
the following.
(I) In the St. Louis metropolitan area, Missouri plan judges are rated
higher in overall performance than elected judges by those lawyers
who practice in both the city (which uses the Missouri plan) and the
suburbs (St. Louis County, which uses partisan election).
(2) In the two major cities where trial judges are selected by the
Missouri plan, a high percentage of lawyers favor the plan over other
methods of judicial selection (79% in Kansas City; 70% in St. Louis).
(3) Most Missouri lawyers agree that the plan gets "better" judges
than popular election (whatever "better" judges may have meant to
the individual lawyers who responded). The lawyers explain this result
mainly by their belief that qualified lawyers are more likely to seek
the bench if spared the expense and uncertainty of an elective contest.
(4) Although lawyers' ratings of Missouri plan judges cover a wide
range, no Missouri plan judge was in the lowest quartile of all judges
who were rated (elected and Missouri plan), suggesting that one result
of the plan is to weed out the very poorly qualified candidates.
(5) Most lawyers agree that the tenure feature of the plan in practice
results in life tenure (an incumbent runs unopposed, without party
designation, and on the sole question whether he shall be retained);
they believe, therefore, that the main problem with the plan at present
is the difficulty of getting off the bench those judges who become unable
to perform their duties. About four-fifths of all lawyers in Missouri
favor a mandatory retirement age for trial judges. Presently, only
appellate judges are subject to mandatory retirement, at seventy-five.
It is a reasonable conclusion, by inference from the results of the
Watson study, that there is not at present any substantial concern
among St. Louis lawyers about the local trial judiciary's overall level
of competence (in the sense of job-skill). The research upon which this
article is based found nothing to contradict such a conclusion. This is
not to say that all the St. Louis trial judges are equally competent, nor
that any one of them is an ideal judge (if one exists), nor that they
have always been free from criticism. It is to say only that the problems
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of judicial misconduct and disability related to age have been and are
of obvious concern, and the problem of incompetence is not. Con-
sequently, this report deals only with the first two subjects.
V. DISABILITY
A. The Problem and the Procedure
Of the twelve judges who terminated their service on the St. Louis
circuit (trial) bench between 1950 and 1965, eight (67%) left office
because of disability. In Kansas City, of the twelve trial judges who left
office during the same period, five (42%) did so because of disability.
In both cities, the total number of judges leaving office is small, and
this fact warns against making hasty inferences about the dimensions of
the judicial disability problem. But the percentages referred to above
do show that disability has been a recurring problem. Regarding St.
Louis, there is further evidence of the significance of the problem. In
one year, 1956, three St. Louis trial judges were retired because of age-
related disabilities, and in 1963, 1964, and 1965, there was one dis-
ability retirement each year. Since the trial bench has only twenty
judges, it is apparent that court business has been recurrently disrupted
by the decline in work capacity of a judge who ultimately retired
because disabled. This disruption is exacerbated by a temporary de-
crease in manpower which results from the time taken to select the
retired judge's successor. The selection process usually takes a month,
often two, according to the records of appointments in St. Louis during
the last fifteen years.
Since there is no reason to assume that St. Louis judges have a unique
susceptibility to illness and aging, the cause of the city's noticeable
incidence of disability problems must be elsewhere. The cause appears
to be the structure of the state's judicial retirement laws. They are a
model of rigor and parsimony. Any judge who is at least sixty-five with
six years continuous service before 1959 or twelve years service in the
aggregate may retire with benefits of one-third of salary. (A circuit
judge's salary is $19,000. Effective January 1, 1969, it will be $23,000;
the retirement pay will continue to be one-third of salary.) If not
eligible for one-third, he receives nothing. This is an across-the-board
formula, applicable to all cases without regard to the circumstances of
retirement. It applies equally to appellate judges who by law must
retire at seventy-five; to judges who retire voluntarily (few do); and to
judges who are retired because disabled (a noticeable number are).
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There is one slightly moderating provision. The judge who is retired
because disabled gets one-half salary until the end of his current term,
a period which can never be more than a full term (six years), and will
probably be somewhat less. At the end of his current term, the retired
disabled judge is in the same position as his peers-retirement pay of
one-third salary if eligible, nothing if not.
Two provisions of this judicial retirement scheme are salient. First,
trial judges are not subject to mandatory retirement. Of the approxi-
mately 280 judges in the state, only the sixteen appellate judges are
subject to mandatory retirement (at seventy-five). There is no age
limit on either the ninety-seven trial judges or the 162 probate judges
and magistrates. Second, the maximum retirement pay for circuit judges
is $6333. This seems modest, not to say niggardly, by any standard-
except, apparently, the Missouri legislature's, which has successfully
resisted several attempts in the last fifteen years to raise it to $9500
(half of salary). David L. Millar, chairman of the state bar's Judicial
Retirement Committee for twelve years (until 1966), has said:46
One factor that stands out of my... experience with the ques-
tion of retirement of judges is that the reluctance of the judge
to recognize his condition and to retire is due primarily to the
inadequacy of the retirement pay. Almost without exception,
when judges have been approached on the subject of disability
retirement, we are met with the statement that they can't afford
to retire.
Besides the absence of mandatory retirement and the poor retire-
ment pay, a third factor contributes to the difficulty that a disabled
judge has in recognizing and accepting the fact of his condition: the
quite human reluctance, peculiar neither to Missouri nor to the judi-
ciary, to disengage from one's career. For many people, retirement
suggests inactivity, purposelessness, a feeling of no longer being useful
or needed. These prospects cannot be very appealing to men who have
enjoyed busy and active careers.
Together these three factors produce a situation in which Missouri
trial judges can find no compelling reason to end their service volun-
tarily, and at least one compelling reason-a two-thirds cut in income
-not to do so. The predictable result is that they will stay in office
until they die, probably at some point beyond that where they are
capable of fully active service, or are compelled to retire because dis-
46. Letter from David L. Millar, Esq., to Wade G. Baker, Executive Secretary, Missouri
Bar Association, April 30, 1964 (quoted by permission).
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abled. The simple statistics presented in Table 2 show that this is just
what in fact happens.
TABLE 2
REASONS FOR TERMINATION OF SERVICE OF TRIAL JUDGES IN
ST. LoUIs AND KANSAS CITY, 1941-1966
Reason for Total Per cent
termination Kansas both of total
of service St. Louis City cities terminations
Retired or resigned because of dis-
abilities related to age 8 5 131 39
Died in office 6 6 12 37
Resigned to take another office 3 3 6# 18
Retired voluntarily 0 1 1 3
Not retained by voters 0 1 1 3
17 16 33 100%
Notes:
* Of these thirteen, eleven were retired for disability by order of the Committee on
Retirement of Judges and Magistrates (described in text). The other two left office osten-
sibly voluntarily (one resigned, one retired), but actually only after the Judicial Retire-
ment Committee (described in text) had exerted persistent persuasions on them to
terminate their service because of disability.
# Of these six, five resigned to take another judicial office, and one resigned to take a
position outside the judiciary.
The group of judges in the table is those thirty-three judges whose
service on the trial courts of St. Louis and Kansas City terminated
during the twenty-five year period 1941-1966. Public and confidential
records were used to determine the actual reason for termination in
each case. As the table shows, only seven judges (21%) left office volun-
tarily, one by retiring and six to take other jobs.
Of the remaining twenty-six terminations (79%), twelve were by
death in office and thirteen were for disability. None of the thirteen
disability terminations was voluntary in the sense that the judge de-
cided of his own volition to end his service, then took the formal steps
necessary to do so. In each case, external persuasions were exerted,
either directly on the judge by the bar's Judicial Retirement Committee
(described later herein) or indirectly, e.g., through his family. Of the
thirteen judges retired because disabled, nine were over seventy at
the time they left office, and six were over seventy-five. Thus a manda-
tory retirement provision for trial judges pegged at age seventy, or even
seventy-five, could have substantially reduced the incidence of dis-
ability in office since 1941 in St. Louis and Kansas City.
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The function of mandatory retirement is to withdraw from the
bench that group of judges in which disabilities related to aging are
most likely to occur. But while mandatory retirement can thus reduce
the incidence of age-related disability, it cannot eliminate the disability
problem altogether. There are other problems, such as the judge in
his early sixties who was retired as disabled because found to be
"highly nervous, subject to continuous mental disturbances, depressed,
emotional, and fearful of financial instability." Even an unrealistically
low mandatory retirement age, e.g., sixty-five, will not eliminate this
kind of problem completely; in any case, no state presently has a
mandatory retirement age lower than seventy. Four of the thirteen
disability terminations mentioned in the preceding paragraph-two
each in St. Louis and Kansas City-involved judges under seventy. A
complete solution to the problem therefore requires not only mandatory
retirement but also a procedure to retire those judges who become
disabled before mandatory retirement age.
Missouri has such a procedure. The power to retire judges for dis-
ability was granted to the general assembly by the Missouri Constitution
of 1875. By two-thirds vote of each house and with approval of the
governor, the general assembly could retire a judge who was "unable
to discharge the duties of his office with efficiency, by reason of con-
tinued sickness, or physical or mental infirmity.' 47
The extent to which the 1875 procedure was used is lost to history.
It is fair to guess that it was used very little, on the assumption that
there was no more willingness then than now to crank up a cumbersome
formal public proceeding to terminate the service of a sick or senile
judge.
In any case, when Missouri wrote its most recent constitution, in
1945, the power to retire judges for disability was taken from the gen-
eral assembly and given to a committee of nine judges.48 The supreme
court is given power to make rules of procedure for the committee and
the constitutional provision expressly enjoins that there be "notice ...
fair hearing and ... a finding of two-thirds of the committee that the
disability is permanent."
By statute, the committee is designated the Committee on Retirement
of Judges and Magistrates (hereinafter Committee on Retirement or
47, Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 41 (1875). See also Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (1865); No. CoNsr.
art. V, § 16 (1820).
48, Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 27. The other basic provisions of law are Mo. REv. STAT.
j§ 476A00-40 (1959), and Mo. Sup. CT. R. 12.
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judges' committee). Its initial organization was accomplished with dis-
patch. The 1945 constitution was adopted February 27, 1945, and
within the year the legislature passed an enabling statute, the supreme
court Wrote rules of procedure, and the committee held an organiza-
tional meeting. Notwithstanding this promising beginning, the com-
mittee was not immediately active. No formal complaints were received
for two and a half years, and it was January, 1948, before the committee
entered its first order of retirement. Since then, however, it has met
nearly every year, and by the end of 1966 had retired thirty judges. 4
Not surprisingly, twenty-seven of the thirty were circuit judges, probate
judges, and magistrates, none of whom, it will be recalled, are subject
to mandatory retirement at a specified age. The pace of business has
been irregular: the committee retired six judges in 1956, four each
in 1955, 1963, and 1965, three in 1966, and one in each of nine other
years.
In every case but one in which the Committee on Retirement has
held a formal hearing during the eighteen-year period ending 1966,
the judge was found disabled and was retired. One should not, however,
rely upon the number of judges retired by the committee as a measure
of the extent of the disability problem in Missouri. Not every situation
of a disabled judge comes to the official attention of the committee, and
of those which do, not all reach the hearing stage. In the course of this
research, reliable evidence was uncovered of at least nine more incidents
of judicial disability in which the committee did not act for some rea-
son.5o
On one occasion, a judge was sufficiently incapacitated that his court
had to bring in outside judges to keep up with the workload; the situa-
tion had become nearly intolerable by the time the judge eventually
died. Another judge, after submitting medical affidavits attesting to his
disability to the Committee on Retirement, died on the day of the
committee hearing. In a third case, no action at all was taken, apparently
49. The total includes one judge of the supreme court, two from courts of appeals,
fourteen circuit judges (six from St. Louis, five from Kansas City), eleven probate judges,
and two magistrates.
50. Although the Committee on Retirement did not hold a hearing and make a
finding in any of these cases, I am satisfied from the evidence that the judges were in
fact substantially incapacitated from performing their ordinary official duties and would
have been found disabled if there had been a hearing. This evidence includes: the age
of the judge (three were over seventy-six, for example); written statements by the judges
themselves about their physical condition; and confidential information about the judge's
physical and mental condition from persons in a position to be knowledgeable and with
no apparent motive to falsify.
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because the judge's condition was simply not causing much of a prac-
tical problem in the court's operations, even though he was incipiently
senile (and not very competent as well). In two cases, the judge died
after formal proceedings had been initiated but before the hearing.
Two judges terminated their service on their own motion after being
tactfully approached by friends or professional associates. Similar per-
suasions were exerted in two other cases, where the judges took the
alternative of not seeking an additional term when their current terms
expired.
By statute, the Committee on Retirement is given basic procedural
powers: to hold hearings "as it may deem necessary in the discharge of
its duties;" to issue subpoenas, compel the attendance of witnesses
and the giving of testimony; to require a physical or mental examina-
tion of a judge and to appoint a doctor to make the examination; and
to punish for contempts arising from refusal to obey its "lawful orders
or process."5 1
The organization of the committee and the details of its procedure
are prescribed by supreme court rule. The committee members, who
serve one-year terms, are three judges of the supreme court, one judge
from each of the three courts of appeals, and three circuit judges. All
are elected by the judges of the respective courts at the annual meeting
of the state judicial conference. A chairman, by custom usually one
of the supreme court members, and a vice chairman are chosen by the
committee itself; the clerk of the supreme court is secretary. Besides
the members and the secretary, the only other person directly involved
in proceedings is the state attorney general, who is directed by statute
to assist the committee.52
Committee action can be triggered by either "information in writ-
ing" charging that the judge is disabled or by a statement from the
judge himself that he requests retirement because of disability. In
practice, it is always a statement from the judge which initiates pro-
ceedings; on only one occasion has a written complaint been prepared
by a third party, and it was withdrawn when at the last minute the
judge decided to resign rather than face a disability proceeding. Upon
receiving a judge's request for retirement, the committee chairman
has authority to make an informal investigation. The investigation is
pro forma, since the chairman usually already knows the background
of the case: senility and other age-related disabilities are conditions
51. Mo. REv. STAT. § 476.400-476.420 (1959).
52. Id. § 476.430.
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that become progressively apparent, and the chairman is likely to have
been unofficially aware of the situation for some time. If he needs
substantiating evidence, lawyers in the judge's community are asked
for statements about his physical or mental condition. In some cases,
the judge's doctor writes a letter to the committee.
Procedurally, the next step is to file an "application for retirement,"
whereupon the chairman orders a hearing. The application is filed by
the state attorney general, who presents the case at the hearing. The
subject judge is afforded the usual procedural rights: notice, fair hear-
ing, right to appear, to present evidence, to be represented by counsel.
To this extent, the prescribed procedure of the Committee on Retire-
ment is modeled on the adversary system. But a supreme court rule
expressly disclaims an adversary character for the proceedings, enjoin-
ing that they shall be, rather, "an impartial investigation to ascertain
the facts with due regard to public welfare and the rights of the judge
or magistrate under investigation."
In practice, the proceedings bear little resemblance to the adversary
model. Except for the fact that a hearing is actually held (in order to
make a record), the proceedings are informal. While it has the powers
to do so, for example, the committee has never ordered a doctor's
examination of a judge or subpoenaed a witness. Sometimes, for reasons
of health, the judge does not appear personally at the hearing, al-
though he always has notice of it-indeed, it is he who initiated it.
The facts are never controverted. The evidence is almost always in
the form of a letter from the judge's doctor or statements from lawyers
who have appeared in the judge's court, as to his forgetfulness, poor
hearing or eyesight, absent-mindedness, general physical infirmity, or
other indicia of disability.
Besides the absence of an adversary character, another factor that
contributes to informality in the proceedings is the relatively small
size of the state's legal community and consequent likelihood that a
particular judge will be known to both his peers and a substantial part
of the trial bar, at least in the two big cities.53 Since there are only
about 280 judges in the state, one or more of the committee members
is likely to know the subject judge in a proceeding, if only on a pro-
53. Roughly one-third of the state's 6600 lawyers practice in St. Louis and one-third
in Kansas City. In either city, there are not more than several hundred lawyers in the
active trial bar, which is the group most knowledgeable about a judge's day-to-day per-
formance in court. Since there are only twenty trial judges in St. Louis and fifteen in
Kansas City, the odds are quite high that a particular judge will be more than casually
known to a substantial part of the trial bar.
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fessional basis. And since the lawyers who are the judge's personal and
professional friends are the people who know him best, it is they who
always are called upon to give statements about his disability. Con-
sequently the natural sympathies of the decision-makers and witnesses
in a committee proceeding are reinforced by personal and professional
loyalties.
Early in the committee's history it was more formal in its pro-
ceedings, particularly regarding evidence and fact-finding. In 1949,
in its second case, the committee summoned a number of witnesses to
testify in person, including the judge's son and his personal physician.
The following year, in its third case, the committee received in evi-
dence depositions from a doctor, the county sheriff, and a nurse who
was attending the subject judge in his home after two major operations.
The high point of formality in fact-finding was perhaps the case in
which the committee, obviously lifting the vocabulary of its findings
bodily from the doctor's report, found the judge to be suffering from
"'hypertension, acute myocardial infarction, ventricular hypertrophy,
and intermittent attacks of coronary occlusion."
Gradually it developed that only clear-cut cases reached the hearing
stage. 54 (In every case that has reached hearing, the judge was ordered
retired.) The committee became correspondingly less formal in its
proceedings and depended more on its own common-sense judgments.
In a case in the early 1950's, the committee retired a judge it found to
be "highly nervous, subject to continuous mental disturbances, unable
to sleep, very depressed and emotional, fearful of financial instability,
and continually worrisome about matters with little or no provoca-
tion." In all cases during the last fifteen years, the committee's finding
of fact has simply been in the words of the constitutional provision:
"unable to discharge the duties of his office with efficiency by reason
of continued physical [or mental] infirmity and the disability is per-
manent."
Two-thirds of the committee must concur in this finding for an
order of retirement to be made. The order, which is effective im-
54, This might have been because the committee chairman screened out doubtful
cases; or it might have been because lawyers and judges, seeing that the committee pro-
ceeded formally and demanded a high standard of proof, were discouraged from filing
a written "complaint" in doubtful cases. It is impossible to say, however, which of these
explanations-if either-is the correct one, since there is no way to know about those
cases which no one complained of in writing, and the committee keeps no records of
cases that are screened out at some point before "information in writing" is filed with
the chairman.
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mediately, is entered in the committee's records, kept by the clerk
of the supreme court. Copies are sent to the governor, secretary of
state, and the state auditor. No constitutional provision, statute, or
rule of court requires the proceedings or records to be confidential,
but they have by custom been so, except for the fact of the decision
that a certain judge has been ordered retired.
As noted earlier, by constitutional mandate a judge retired by the
Committee on Retirement receives one-half his salary until the end of
his term.55 Thereafter he receives the standard retirement pay of one-
third of salary, if at the time of the committee's order he was at least
age sixty-five with (a) six years continuous service before 1959 or (b)
twelve years service in the aggregate.
One procedural impediment in the committee's operation is that it
cannot initiate proceedings on its own motion. Missouri Supreme
Court Rule 12.03 provides:
Upon information in writing being filed with the secretary [of
the committee] charging that [a judge] . . . is unable to discharge
the duties of his office with efficiency by reason of continued
sickness or physical or mental infirmity, or upon a statement of
[the judge himself] ... that he is so incapacitated ... the chair-
man... may cause the matter to be investigated informally ....
(Emphasis added).
The rule implies that the chairman may not initiate the informal
investigation until and unless the secretary has received information
in writing from a third party or a statement from the judge himself.
This has in fact been the practice of the committee, which has taken
the position that it cannot be self-activating. Either the subject judge
must make a statement of his disability or a third party must file writ-
ten information of it, or else the committee cannot proceed.
No provision of law expressly prohibits the committee to move on
its own motion. Perhaps, then, an argument can be made that as a
matter of law it is not forbidden to do so.56 But the question is aca-
55. According to a 1953 opinion of the state attorney general, judges who are retired
as disabled are entitled to receive one-half the salary they would be making if they
had not been retired, rather than one-half the salary they were receiving at the time of
retirement. Thus, if the salary of a judge's office is increased between the time of his
retirement for disability and the end of his term of office, he is entitled to one-half the
increased salary. Op. Mo. ATr'y. GEN. No. 5 (1953). See supplement Index to Note follow.
ing Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 27 (Supp. 1966).
56. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 27 and Mo. REv. STAT. § 476.410 (1952) give the Supreme Court
power to prescribe rules of procedure for the Committee on Retirement. Rule 12, quoted
in part in the text, was made under this authority. Two questions of law must then be
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demic, since the committee's operations are not in practice impeded
by its inability to be self-activating. The reason is that this procedural
vacuum is filled by another agency, the state bar association's Judicial
Retirement Committee (hereinafter sometimes called the bar com-
mittee).
The Judicial Retirement Committee consists of seven lawyers (in-
creased from five in 1963) appointed by the president of the state bar
association and is empowered
to receive information from any source . . . and to initiate an
inquiry on its own motion, as to whether a judge is unable to dis-
charge the duties of his office with efficiency ... ; to conduct an
investigation as to the facts; and if it determines that such judge
is unable to discharge the duties of his office with efficiency by
reason of continued sickness or physical or mental infirmity, and
that such disability is permanent, to file a formal information
against such judge with the [Committee on Retirement of Judges
and Magistrates] .... 57
Since the bar committee is entirely the creation of a resolution
adopted by the board of governors of the state bar, it has no official
standing as an agency of the state. It is nevertheless an essential part
of the process of getting disabled judges out of office, because it is the
mechanism that activates the Committee on Retirement, albeit some-
times indirectly. It does this by exerting various persuasions upon the
judge to encourage him to request disability retirement himself. If
the judge is recalcitrant, the bar committee can file a written complaint
against him with the Committee on Retirement.
Although the bar committee may act upon information from any
source, it is the committee's own members who provide the initial
information in most cases. They in turn get it from first-hand observa-
tion or from other lawyers who bring it to them informally. The com-
mittee membership is geographically representative-one member
from each of the three court of appeals districts and two each from
St. Louis and Kansas City; thus at least one member almost always
considered. The first is whether under this grant of rule-making power the court could
make a rule that the committee may proceed on its own motion. The second question
arises from the maxim of construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expres-
sion of one thing is the exclusion of another). Does this mean that Rule 12, because it
affirMatively specifies (a) information in writing or (b) statement of the subject judge as
activating mechanisms, must be construed to prohibit by implication other mechanisms,
such as the committee's own motion?
57. Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Missouri Bar, Sept. 10, 1954. 11 J.
Mo, B. 1 (1955).
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has first-hand knowledge about a particular case. When the committee
member's personal knowledge is not conclusive, an inquiry is made,
usually by the member who is from the subject judge's community or
geographically nearest it.
When initial information suggests the need for further inquiry,
several approaches may be used. In nearly all cases, local lawyers who
have appeared regularly in the judge's court are asked to give con-
fidential opinions of his physical and mental condition. The judge
himself may be visited by the committee member and asked about
his health. Sometimes his doctor is consulted. Occasionally, a check
is made of the judge's attendance and work records.
If the committee determines that the judge is unable to discharge
his duties efficiently, it deputes one of its members to try to persuade
the judge to retire voluntarily. The tactics used in this effort vary with
the case. Not infrequently, the committee member and the judge have
associated professionally; sometimes they are personal friends. In these
circumstances, the committee member may approach the judge per-
sonally. Or the medium of persuasion might be family or colleagues.
In one case, the committee operated through the judge's son, a lawyer,
who was able after a number of entreaties to persuade his father to
request retirement for disability. In another case, the judge's court
sent three of its members to call upon the judge or his wife and broach
the subject of retirement.
Sometimes the judge responds understandingly to these persuasions
and agrees to terminate his service. In practice, termination is usually
accomplished by the judge himself requesting the Committee on Re-
tirement (the judges' committee) to retire him for disability. Or the
judge can resign or retire on his own; this has happened in a few cases.
When the judge is unwilling either to resign or retire on his own or to
request disability retirement, the bar committee's response could be to
file an information against him with the Committee on Retirement.
This would certainly be an effective push, since the Committee on Re-
tirement would then have to investigate the case. Notwithstanding
the availability of this response, the policy of the bar committee has
been to exert low-intensity persuasions over a relatively long period of
time rather than simply to file a written information immediately.
This policy, a result of choice and not necessity, is dictated by con-
siderations of practicality and decency. The practical consideration is
that an unseemly eagerness to litigate instead of negotiate would give
the bar committee a reputation for poor judgment and thus decrease
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its effectiveness. Neither the judge in a particular case nor the legal
community in general would be cooperatively disposed toward the
committee if it had that reputation. The consideration of decency is
the genuine sympathy of committee members, to say nothing of that
of the legal community at large, who want to preserve the judge's
self-respect and dignity. This is better accomplished by encouraging
him to terminate his service voluntarily than by compelling him to
respond in a formal proceeding to the charge that he is unable to do
his job any longer.
Because the bar committee's procedure is low-intensity and aimed at
consensual response, it does not try to dictate the mode of termination
of service in a partidular case. Thus, on occasion, other modes besides
retirement (voluntary or by the judges' committee) and resignation
have been used. When the judge's current term has only a year or so
to run, for example, a very simple solution is for him not to seek
retention or re-election at the expiration of the term, as in the follow-
ing case.
Judge IV had over twenty years service and was widely respected
both by lawyers and the community at large. After a stroke at the age
of sixty-eight, he performed no duties at all for thirteen months. His
docket was handled during this time by another judge, assisted oc-
casionally by other judges assigned to hear the jury cases. An investiga-
tion begun after the situation came to official attention revealed that
the substitute judges had made no complaint of the extra work, nor
lawyers of any delay; that the dispatch of court business was not sig-
nificantly impeded; that Judge W had no independent financial means;
that his term would expire in less than a year. It was also learned that
through intercession of the judge's friends, a tacit understanding had
arisen among the bar whereby no action to compel his retirement
would be taken provided he did not seek re-election. No official action
was taken, and the judge did not run for another term.
Another response to the problem is makeshift means short of ter-
minating the judge's service, as in the following case. Judge M had
been elected at age seventy-four to a second four-year term as county
probate judge. At seventy-six, his health began to fail a bit, as he him-
self admitted. Someone complained and an investigation was made.
The investigator talked to the leading citizens in Judge M's hometown
of several thousand people-the mayor, the president of the bank,
some lawyers, and others. He learned that the judge, though unani-
mously agreed to be honest, courteous, and industrious, was not really
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too competent. Combined with his declining health, this made for a
sluggish pace in the business of the probate court.
The investigator also learned that Judge M's clerk, a capable lady of
mature years, was carrying on much of the court's business with the
assistance of local lawyers. Most of the work was routine enough to be
handled by an intelligent layman anyway. Aware of his limitations,
the judge, not unwillingly, had accommodated to this arrangement.
When the investigator's report was submitted, it was decided not to
take any official action. The judge died a few years later.
While the service of a disabled judge thus can be terminated in any
one of several ways, disability retirement by order of the judges' com-
mittee is, as we have seen, financially advantageous for the judge.
Judges retired for disability get one-half of salary until the end of their
current term (and one-third thereafter, assuming they are eligible).
This temporary financial advantage may not always be a primary con-
cern, of course. Judge H, who was over seventy-five, was clearly disabled
and could have been retired for disability if he had requested it. But,
insisting to the Judicial Retirement Committee that he was not dis-
abled, he chose to resign instead and forego the one-half salary benefit.
Such reluctance by the judge to recognize his condition is not an
unusual reaction to the persuasions initiated by the bar committee.
Though some judges respond understandingly to preliminary over-
tures, others do not. The committee member may have to visit the
judge a number of times; other persuasions, from family and col-
leagues, may be brought to bear. It is not unusual for six to nine
months to elapse from the time of the committee's initial contact with
the judge to the time his service is officially terminated. In several
cases, the committee's efforts have extended over a period of twelve
to eighteen months.
Notwithstanding the common occurrence of such delays, the bar
committee has adhered to its style of operations and has not adopted
the obvious alternative of filing a written information with the Com-
mittee on Retirement as soon as there is clear evidence of the judge's
disability. In fact, the bar committee has never actually filed a written
information with the Committee on Retirement.
Once, though, it came very close to doing so. Judge E, at age seventy-
one, had been intermittently ill for seven months before the bar com-
mittee acted. Personal friends of the judge called on him; a colleague
also exerted persuasions. The judge temporized. As time passed, the
committee's suggestions became more pointed. Finally, a deadline was
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set and the judge was told that if he himself did not act, a written in-
formation charging his disability would be filed. The information had
been drawn up and signed when at the last minute the judge agreed
to request the Committee on Retirement to retire him for disability.
B. Conclusion
What is most intriguing about Missouri's procedure for retirement
of disabled judges is the incongruity between its formal characteristics
and its actual operation. The basic provisions of law58 create a procedure
formally indistinguishable from the adversary model-complaint, in-
vestigation, charge, hearing, counsel, witnesses, evidence, findings,
decision. In reality, the proceedings are consensual, informal, and
friendly, with the result always foregone. The character of the whole
proceeding is administrative much more than adversary.
The fact of this incongruity between theory and practice leads to the
conclusion that a formal adversary response to the problem of judicial
disability is unacceptable to the legal community. On reflection, this
is not particularly surprising, but it is a point not mentioned at all in
the literature of the subject and therefore worth emphasizing. Different
values are at stake, different community attitudes come into play,
depending upon whether a particular case involves bribery or senility,
stupidity or laziness. Misconduct evokes condemnation; disability
evokes sympathy. In the latter case, accordingly, the community finds
it acceptable to terminate the judge's service through the back door
of retirement rather than the front door of removal.
The reason for incongruity between theory and practice in Missouri's
retirement procedure is a behavior pattern produced by the conver-
gence of three discrete facts. The first fact has to do with the nature of
the problem of disability. Rather than being an isolatable act or event,
disability related to age usually manifests itself gradually over a period
of time, making it difficult sometimes for the responsible agency to
decide exactly when to initiate retirement proceedings against a judge.
This decision can be made unnecessary by the device of mandatory
retirement at a fixed age, but there is no such provision for trial judges
in Missouri. Thus the bar committee, which is responsible to initiate
retirement proceedings, faces anew with each case the decision when to
begin action. And in making this decision, the committee is compelled
to be quite cautious, in order to insure its reputation for sound judg-
58. Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 27; Mo. REv. S-TAT. § 476.400 et seq. (1952); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 12
(1960).
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ment and its acceptability by the local legal community. The result
is that the committee will not act until a judge's disability is unques-
tionably apparent. In one St. Louis case, for example, the committee
waited until the judge, who was over seventy-five and had been inter-
mittently ill for several years, had become functionally blind; his eye-
sight was so bad that his clerk had to read his research and jury instruc-
tions for him.
The second fact is the meager judicial retirement pay for Missouri
trial judges, $6333 (one-third of salary). Quite apart from the judge's
own disenchantment with the prospect of a two-thirds cut in income,
the lawyer member of the bar committee who is deputed to induce the
judge to retire will naturally have some reluctance about performing
his duty, knowing what the economic consequences are.
The third fact has to do with the way the bar committee approaches
a judge to persuade him to retire. 'While it seems originally to have
been planned that the whole committee would call upon the judge in
each case, this approach was never actually used, probably because
impractical and so obviously threatening to the judge. What was and
is done is that one member is selected to visit the judge, and usually
it is that member who knows the judge best, personally or profes-
sionally. This mode of operations puts a substantial emotional burden
upon the individual committee member to whom the task falls.
The convergence of these three facts-the gradual appearance of
disabilities related to aging, the poor retirement pay, and the per-
sonalized approach of the bar committee-causes the committee's
operations to proceed at an unusually sluggish pace. The necessity for
the committee to be certain of its ground before acting and the natural
reluctance and sympathy of the committee member who must imple-
ment the decision to act are mutually reinforcing tendencies. The
result is that the committee operates at a painfully slow pace compared
to what might be expected. It is crucial to realize, however, that under
present conditions the committee cannot act any other way, unless
it is prepared to offend community standards of decency and tact.
The slow pace of operations has been evidenced in the most recent
St. Louis cases. In 1963, 1964, and 1965, one judge of the trial court
left office each year for reasons of disability related to aging. (Their
ages were eighty-three, seventy-nine, and seventy-eight.) One of them
was intermittently ill for several years before he finally left office; in
one of the other two cases, it took the bar committee over a year to
persuade the judge to terminate his service.
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It is true that whenever Missouri's retirement procedure is invoked,
the judge is eventually retired. From this point of view, the procedure
works. But if evaluated in economic terms, the procedure is the model
of a system that is effective but inefficient. It is effective in the sense
that it gets the job done, which is to say that a judge who becomes
disabled is sooner or later gotten off the bench. But it is inefficient in
the sense that this result comes at a high cost.
The cost consequences of judicial disability can be considered from
two perspectives: the cost of the problem and the cost of its solution.
We know from this research that in most cases in Missouri the judge
has been functionally incapacitated for several months, often longer,
before action is taken toward his retirement. One economic cost of the
problem is therefore the salary of a judge who at worst is unable to do
any work at all, and who at best is only marginally productive. And one
social cost of the problem is therefore the disruption and delay of court
business while proceedings to retire a disabled judge and appoint his
successor are in progress for six or eight months or longer.
If one were to study the calendar and docket of the St. Louis trial
court for the periods when the most recent cases of judicial disability
were pending, it would be difficult to find a direct causal connection
between the judge's disability and any disruption of the normal pace
of court business. But there is no question that such a connection
exists. One who is prepared to argue that court business is not dis-
rupted when one of twenty judges is out of service must be prepared
to argue that the court did not really need twenty judges in the first
place. But if nineteen can do the work of twenty, eighteen can do the
work of nineteen. The argument is subject to reductio ad absurdum.
As a practical matter, of course, what sometimes happens is that
when a judge becomes disabled, his fellow judges work more, each one
taking on part of the work of their absent colleague. This is what was
done in the case of Judge XV, for example, who after a stroke at the
age of sixty-eight performed no duties at all for thirteen months. His
docket was handled during this time by another judge, assisted oc-
casionally by other judges assigned to hear the jury cases.
But there are two objections to this way of attempting to minimize
the impact on court workload of a judge's absence because of disability.
The objection on practical grounds is that the substitute judges can
keep up with their own duties only by working overtime; if they do
not work overtime, then the calendar in their own courts falls behind.
The objection on grounds of policy is that this kind of ad hoc response
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is a poor way to run a court system. The business-like way to handle
such problems is not to wait for them to cause a crisis but to see that
they do not occur in the first place, or if they do, to deal with them
expeditiously through an arranged plan. An efficient court system, like
an efficient business, is dull: all the crises have been anticipated.
The virtue of Missouri's present procedure for handling judicial
disability is that it seems to cost the state essentially nothing in dollar
terms. All members of both the bar committee (seven lawyers) and
the Committee on Retirement (nine judges) serve without pay. The
negligible cost of the paperwork in a proceeding is absorbed by other
agencies, e.g., the supreme court (whose clerk is secretary of the judges'
committee and responsible for maintaining committee records). There
is never any substantial expense for investigation, witnesses' fees, or
the other usual trappings of litigation.
But to the extent that Missourians are willing to handle the disability
problem by a procedure that is inexpensive but painfully slow and
therefore high in social cost, they must also be willing to tolerate a less
efficient court system. The fact that it is exceedingly difficult to make
with precision a cost calculation that shows the loss to the court system
of paying a disabled judge to stay in office instead of retiring him
promptly does not alter the fact that there is a cost. And if there is a
cost, some attempt to calculate it should be made. The description in
this paper of the dynamics of the present procedure should help illu-
minate the values and alternatives involved in the calculation. Con-
ceivably, Missouri would prefer a more efficient court system and a
more efficient disability retirement procedure, and would be willing
to pay the price of more attractive retirement benefits for its judges.
Better retirement pay would, in turn, make more politically palatable
the idea of mandatory retirement for trial judges, a device that would
do much to reduce the incidence of judicial disability.
VI. MISCONDUCT
A. Three Cases
Three cases of serious judicial misconduct have occurred in Missouri
since 1963. Virgil A. Poelker, a St. Louis County trial judge, resigned
in March 1963, five days before his impeachment trial on seventeen
articles of misconduct. Three years later, in March 1966, John Lodwick
Jr., probate judge in north suburban Kansas City, was indicted for
embezzlement, although to date he has not yet been tried. He has,
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however, been tried and convicted in federal court (in May 1968) of
evading payment of federal income taxes on the money allegedly
embezzled. In July 1968, a jury found St. Louis County trial judge
John D. Hasler guilty of misconduct in office on the basis of his per-
sonal involvement with a woman divorce defendant in his court.
Articles of impeachment based on the same facts were adopted by the
Missouri House of Representatives but the judge resigned in August
1968, three days before his scheduled impeachment trial.
Especially in the first of these cases, involving Judge Poelker, Mis-
souri's legal community acted hesitantly and indecisively. From the
time Poelker's misconduct first began coming to public attention in
1961 to the time articles of impeachment were voted, almost two years
elapsed. Whatever the legal community may have been doing behind
the scenes during this period, its main public response was to call for
the judge to resign.
Perhaps, however, the legal community should not be judged too
harshly for its ineffectuality in the Poelker case. It is possible to see, in
retrospect, that everyone in Missouri, lawyers and judges included,
was profoundly shocked and mortified by the scandal Poelker's conduct
created. Such a reaction to events does not usually conduce to im-
mediate and decisive action. It is also possible, in retrospect, to surmise
that the intensity of shock and mortification among Missourians was
roughly proportional to the confidence they had that "it can't happen
here."
In a way, this confidence was justified. For two decades before
Poelker, there had been no incidents of judicial misconduct even re-
motely approaching his case in magnitude of scandal. Moreover, the
Missouri plan of judicial selection 59 had been widely, often extrava-
gantly, praised during these years as the way to "take judges out of
politics" and therefore by implication also the way to keep men like
Poelker off the bench. On the basis of this research and of Professor
Watson's thorough study of the Missouri plan (see note 45 and ac-
companying text), it does seem to be true that in St. Louis and Kansas
City, the two cities using the plan for their trial courts, there has been
no significant concern in the legal community during recent years
with the problem of judicial misconduct. And one can hardly help
remarking on the fact that all three recent misconduct cases were in
non-Missouri plan circuits.
59, See note 40, supra, and accompanying text.
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Because there seems not to have been any serious problem with
judicial misconduct in St. Louis and Kansas City-nor elsewhere in
Missouri for that matter-during the twenty years before Poelker,
it may provide an illuminating historical perspective to recall briefly
the situation in 1940, when the Missouri plan of judicial selection was
adopted. Certain incidents in that period of the state's political history
generated a public concern about the integrity of the judicial establish-
ment which was directly expressed by adoption of a new method of
selecting judges. (Before adoption of the Missouri plan for some courts,
all judges in the state were selected by partisan election.) If public
concern about the integrity of the judicial establishment was renewed
by the Hasler trial, however, it was not expressed when voters went to
the polls in August 1968 to vote on the adoption of a proposed new
judicial article. The article contained a new procedure for removal for
misconduct and was defeated in the primary.60
Political circumstances in Missouri in 1940 made it an opportune
time for a change in the method of judicial selection. The people had
had recent, first-hand experience with the worst aspects of the partisan
election method. In Kansas City, local government, including some of
the courts, was controlled by the openly corrupt political organization
of T. J. "Tom" Pendergast. Once, Kansas City judges who refused to
pay a $500 campaign assessment had their salaries reduced $1500 a
year in reprisal. 61
Across the state, in St. Louis, citizens endured with dwindling
patience the bungling and incompetence of Judge Eugene L. Padberg,
whom the St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorially called a "humiliation to
the law and to the city." Padberg had made his living as a hospital
pharmacist from the time he was admitted to the bar until he became a
judge eight years later. During this period, he handled nine legal
matters-eight divorces and one annulment. After Padberg's defeat in
the 1940 primary (he served one six-year term), some members of the
Democratic Central Committee antagonized the public still further by
trying, unsuccessfully, to get him on the ballot for a vacancy created
by death.
In another incident, the regular Democratic party put up a mediocre
60. Special Study Committee of the Missouri Bar Association, The Proposed Judicial
Article for Missouri: A revision of Article V of the Missouri Constitution prepared for
the Steering Committee of the Citizens Conference on Missouri Courts by a Special Study
Committee appointed by the president of the Missouri Bar (June 1967).
61. Schroeder & Hall, Twenty-Five Years' Experience with Merit Judicial Selection in
Missouri, 44 Tax. L. REV. 1088, 1093 (1966).
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candidate in the 1938 primary to oppose James M. Douglas, a widely
respected supreme court judge seeking re-nomination. Judge Douglas
had offended political leader T. J. Pendergast by voting with the
majority of the court in certain fire insurance litigation. In one case,
the court ordered all of $1,750,000 in impounded funds to be returned
to the policy-holders, thus voiding an agreement between the fire
insurance companies and state superintendent of insurance R. E.
O'Malley, a Pendergast man. Under the O'Malley agreement, only
twenty per cent of these funds would have been returned to policy-
holders, the remainder being distributed to the insurance companies
and their agents and lawyers. Pendergast's efforts to defeat Douglas
resulted in an extremely bitter primary contest, but Douglas won with
a plurality of 120,000 votes.
The Padberg incident and others like it in St. Louis, and Pendergast
politics in Kansas City, generated substantial public sentiment for
change in the method of selecting judges. Proponents of the Missouri
plan capitalized upon this dissatisfaction by organizing a massive voter
education campaign.6 2 Efforts to get the Missouri plan through the state
legislature were blocked, so the plan was submitted to the voters as a
constitutional amendment by initiative petition. Of the 980,000 votes
cast, the plan got 535,000, a margin of 45,000 above the required
majority.
Within six months, disgruntled opponents of the plan had gotten
the senate to pass a resolution allowing a repeal amendment to be
submitted to the voters in 1942. Whatever chance for success the repeal
amendment might otherwise have had, a crucial factor in its defeat was
the exposure in 1941-42 of the malfeasance of a Pendergast judge,
Marion D. Waltner of Kansas City. Waltner's misconduct offered a
political target to supporters of the Missouri plan, who could point to
him as a symbol of the failure of the partisan election method of select-
ing judges. A group of forty-five citizens and community leaders in
Kansas City formed the Committee for the Rejection of Judge Waltner;
as a result of the committee's successful efforts to unseat him, Waltner
has the distinction of being the only judge ever not to be retained
under the Missouri plan.
One incident of Judge Waltner's misconduct came to light in August
1941, when the Kansas City Public Service Company, as defendant in
a damage suit, asked the state supreme court to set aside the judge's
62. J. PELFASON, THE MISSOURI PLAN FOR THE SELECTION OF JUDGES, 33-64 (1945) contains
a detailed account of the campaign for adoption of the Missouri plan.
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order granting the plaintiff a change of venue. Judge Waltner had
previously refused the Public Service Company's request for a change
of venue. Subsequently it was revealed that requests for changes of
venue from Judge Waltner, based on allegations of prejudice, had
been averaging fifteen a month; the Public Service Company routinely
requested a change when any case in which it was involved was as-
signed to his court. A supreme court commissioner appointed to hear
testimony on the allegations of prejudice found as a fact that the judge
was "actually prejudiced" against the company to such an extent that
it could not get a fair trial in his court.
Another incident involved efforts by the Kansas City Department of
Health to enforce against a meat processer the city ordinance requiring
local inspection of all meat not subject to federal inspection. After a
hearing in July 1941, Judge Waltner took the case under advisement
but still had not rendered a decision by October 1942. Legal maneu-
vers by the city council to force a decision were unavailing. In another
case, a divorce action, Judge Waltner heard a motion by the husband
in April 1936 to quash execution of a judgment for alimony; the
motion was still undecided five years later. The husband, according to
the Kansas City Star, was an "office associate of a Pendergast sub-boss."
Based upon these and other incidents, the Committee for the Rejec-
tion of Judge Waltner publicly accused the judge of prejudice in decid-
ing cases, delay of court business, appointment of grand juries with
"distinct political coloring," extreme rudeness and discourtesy to
lawyers, and inefficiency in running his court. In the campaign months
preceding the 1942 election, the two Kansas City newspapers, the Star
and the Times, co-operated with the committee by regular publication
of stories containing the evidence on which these charges were based.
The Pendergast organization countered the committee's attack on
Judge Waltner with a vigorous campaign in his defense. The election
was a close one; of 80,000 votes cast, the margin of the judge's defeat
was a bare 5,000.
In the same election in which Judge Waltner was defeated for
retention, the amendment to repeal the Missouri plan was defeated
by a margin of 86,000 votes, nearly twice the margin of victory for
plan proponents as at the 1940 election when the plan was first adopted.
(The plan was approved a third time when adopted as part of a new
state constitution in 1945).
With the perspective of history, we can see that the 1942 election
had two important political consequences. The consequence of the
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defeat of Judge Waltner was justification of the claim, or perhaps hope,
of Missouri plan supporters that the plan's retention feature actually
could be used to oust a judge whom the public found unfit. (Under
the plan, an incumbent runs unopposed without party designation
on the sole question whether he shall be retained in office.) The con-
sequence of the defeat of the repeal amendment was to frustrate the
hope of the plan's opponents to return to the partisan election method
and thereby restore some measure of improper political influence to
the judicial selection process.
Relieved by the defeat of Judge Waltner and heartened by the twice-
pronounced voter approval of the Missouri plan, its supporters rested
after an arduous campaign. As time passed, plan judges replaced
elected judges; confidence increased that the plan was indeed the way
to "better" judges. The body of Missouri plan literature that began
growing up 63 was overwhelmingly favorable. The American Judicature
Society, a court reform organization, made promotion of the plan one
of its principal activities. The Pendergast era became history. Public
and legal community concern about the problem of judicial mis-
conduct ebbed, as there seemed to be less and less cause for concern.
Outside the St. Louis and Kansas City circuits, trial judges continued
to be selected by partisan election. The vicissitudes of politics made
1958 a Democratic year for St. Louis County, which comprises the
city's prosperous western suburbs, and one casualty of the Democratic
landslide was sixty-seven year old Raymond E. LaDriere, the only
incumbent Republican judge seeking re-election. After fifteen years
on the bench, LaDriere was defeated by a thirty-seven year old Demo-
cratic lawyer making his first bid for public office after admission to the
bar only six years before. His name was Virgil A. Poelker.
Apparently Poelker did not even begin his tenure with clean hands.
Article X of the impeachment resolution later voted by the Missouri
House charged that contingent upon a substantial campaign contribu-
tion from one Victor Hallaner, Poelker had promised a few months
before the election to give favorable consideration, if elected, to Hal-
laner's suggestions of people to be appointed as appraisers in condemna-
tion cases. Whether Poelker ever actually appointed anyone suggested
by Hallaner is not known. It is known, however, that in July 1959,
barely six months after taking the oath of office, Judge Poelker awarded
fees of $7500 to each of three appraisers in a case that normally would
63. See note 42, supra.
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have called for fees of half that amount, or less. 4 Calling the fees
"exorbitant and unreasonable," the Missouri State Highway Com-
missioner filed a motion in St. Louis County Circuit Court to have
them reduced. A newspaper editorial hinted that the incident ought
to be investigated, but nothing seems to have come of the idea.
For the rest of 1959 and all through 1960, Judge Poelker was not
much in the news. His private life during this time may have been less
than exemplary, however. Articles V and VI of the impeachment resolu-
tion charged him with failing to file a state income tax return in 1959
and filing a false one (by knowingly understating his income) in 1960.
In the spring of 1961, during April, May, and June, the dam broke.
In April, Hubert J. Kutz, a building contractor, complained to the
county prosecuting attorney that Judge Poelker owed him money
and would not pay. The prosecutor "conferred" with the judge, who
three weeks later gave Kutz two checks totaling $8000. They bounced.
Judge Poelker, pleading "misunderstanding," later made the checks
good. Kutz probably deserved what he got. Article IV of the impeach-
ment resolution charged that Judge Poelker, while a director and
officer of Mari de Villa Retirement Center, secretly agreed to accept
an attorney's fee for representing Kutz regarding a construction con-
tract between Kutz and the retirement center. The conflict of interest
in this arrangement could scarcely have escaped Kutz's notice.
In May, a civil suit was filed against Judge Poelker for $500 for
building materials delivered to his house. He paid the claim after it
was disclosed in the newspapers. A few weeks later, Karl Kraus Con-
struction Company filed a suit against the judge for money owed for
work done on his house; Kraus eventually got a default judgment for
$3985. The St. Louis County Bar Association adopted a resolution
urging a grand jury investigation of allegations of misconduct against
the judge.
In June, the grand jury indicted Judge Poelker for failure to file a
state income tax return in 1959. The judge, vowing to fight the charge
"to the bitter end," agreed two days later not to hear any cases until
the charge was cleared up. He never resumed his duties. (His salary
continued for nineteen months, however, until January 22, 1963, when
64. See Canon 12 of the Missouri Supreme Court's Canons of Judicial Ethics, Mo. SUP.
CT. R. 1.12 (Supp. 1967) (hereinafter cited to Mo. Sup. CT. R. only):
While not hesitating to fix or approve just amounts [for the services of persons ap.
pointed by him, a judge] . . . should be most scrupulous in granting or approving
compensation for the services or charges of such appointees to avoid excessive allow-
ances, whether or not excepted to or complained of.
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the articles of impeachment were voted, automatically stopping it.)
Legal maneuvers delayed the judge's income tax trial for ten months,
but the bitter end came nevertheless. On April 14, 1962, he was con-
victed and fined $1000, although the conviction was later reversed on
the ground that the state did not prove proper venue.
As the full extent of Judge Poelker's misdeeds came to light, news-
paper editorial admonitions that he should resign changed to demands
for his impeachment. Most of the charges finally brought against the
judge were based upon his tangled financial dealings. He apparently
had overextended himself financially and began borrowing from Peter
to pay Paul. The impeachment resolution charged that Judge Poelker
issued so many bad checks "as to constitute a course of conduct evidenc-
ing a design to avoid the payment of his just debts... and generally
to defraud citizens within his jurisdiction and elsewhere" (article XII);
that with "intent to cheat and defraud," he made false representations
about his income and assets to various banks in order to induce them
to lend him money (articles VII and VIII); and that he borrowed
money from lawyers residing or practicing in his jurisdiction, 65 in-
cluding one loan of $10,000 (article XX).
Several charges arose from Poelker's alleged defalcations as attorney
for the Mar de Villa Retirement Center. It was charged that he mis-
applied, converted to his own use, or failed to account for money
entrusted to him as attorney, director, and officer of the center (articles
I, II, III, and IV). Other clients he apparently treated no better.
Article IX charged that while attorney for U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty
Company before becoming a judge, Poelker received $500 due to the
company which he commingled with his own funds66 and refused to
turn over to the company, even after it had discovered his receipt of
the money and made demand for it. Fidelity and Guaranty finally
hired a lawyer to collect the money, which Poelker paid in November
1961, nearly three years after he had become a judge.
Finally there were several miscellaneous charges. Article XI charged
abuse of authority by threatening to make future adverse and capricious
65. See Mo. SUP. CT. R. 1.32 (Supp. 1967): "A judge should not accept any presents or
favots from litigants, or from lawyers practicing before him or from others whose interests
are likely to be submitted to him for judgment." See also Mo. Sup. CT. R. 1.04 & 1.24
(Supp. 1967).
66. Cf. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4.11 (Supp. 1967): "Money of the client or collected for the
diet or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported
and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstances be commingled
with his own or be used by him."
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rulings against an assistant county prosecuting attorney if the attorney
appealed a certain ruling by Judge Poelker. Article XV charged that
after defaulting upon a loan secured by a mortgage on a boat in his
possession, Judge Poelker concealed the boat from the mortgagee and
refused to disclose its whereabouts, thereby intending "to hinder, delay,
and defraud the mortgagee." Article XVIII charged an improper at-
tempt to influence a grand jury.
During 1962, the case became a notorious scandal throughout the
state. The St. Louis County Bar Association called on Judge Poelker to
resign; newspaper editorials urged his removal. Letters to the editor
columns expressed unanimous public indignation. In April, the judge
was convicted of failure to file a state income tax return in 1959. In
October, he was arrested on a charge of assault arising out of a fight at
a bar between himself and one of his creditors. When he attempted to
resume his official duties in December 1962, having heard no cases
since June 1961, his fellow judges on the St. Louis County Circuit
Court enjoined him from using his office or performing any judicial
functions. The court, its calendar falling behind because of Judge
Poelker's absence, had called a few months earlier for judges from
other circuits to volunteer in helping bring the calendar up to date.
By the end of 1962, the political pressure to get Judge Poelker out
of office had become intolerable. Since the only formal procedure to
accomplish this result in Missouri is impeachment, the task fell to the
Missouri House of Representatives. After investigation by a committee
appointed on January 7, 1963, a resolution containing twenty-one
articles of misconduct was introduced in the House on January 22.
Seventeen of the articles were adopted, most by an overwhelming vote
that reflected a statewide sense of outrage transcending party lines.
On March 13, five days before his trial, the judge resigned. At the
same time, he turned in to the state bar association his license to prac-
tice law. According to a St. Louis newspaper, 7 the preparation of im-
peachment proceedings cost the state $15,864. Additionally, the state
had paid Poelker $31,000 in salary over a period of one year and seven
months during which he heard not one case.
After resigning his judicial office and giving up his law license,
Poelker was successively an operator of heavy machinery, driver of a
beer truck, and car salesman. The day after Christmas 1966, a St. Louis
newspaper reported that he was unemployed and bothered with eye
67. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Mar. 27, 1963. The total includes $14,000 for lawyers.
fees, $1,264 for lawyers expenses, and $600 for witness fees.
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trouble so as to be unable to do manual work. A son lived with him;
several other children lived with his wife, who has since been awarded
their custody and a divorce. The federal government holds an uncol-
lectible lien against him for $14,903 in delinquent taxes.
Three years, almost to the day, after Judge Poelker's resignation,
John Lodwick Jr., judge of the probate court in Clay county (north
suburban Kansas City), was indicted on seven counts of embezzlement.
The indictment charged that he had taken $2,812 in court fines levied
during 1961 when he was a town magistrate.
At the time of the indictment, Lodwick was a prestigious name in
the law and politics of Clay county. Lodwick Sr., the judge's father,
was a former mayor of their hometown of Excelsior Springs (population
6500) and one of three lawyers in the town, where he had practiced
since 1936. The judge's younger brother, David, was in their father's
firm and was also part-time assistant county prosecuting attorney. The
judge's mother was a member of the Clay County Democratic Central
Committee. Judge Lodwick himself was vice-president of the county bar
association, a former president of the county Young Democrats, and a
forner Democratic state committeeman.
After graduation from the University of Michigan Law School,
where he was president of his senior class, Lodwick Jr. spent two years
in the family firm before running successfully for a four-year term as
magistrate in 1954. He won a second term to the $7,200 a year position
in 1958, then in 1962 defeated incumbent Keller Bell to win the
probate judgeship. In the spring of 1966, the last year of his term as
probate judge, a two-week grand jury investigation of Judge Lodwick's
magistrate court records for 1961 resulted in his indictment on March
10 on seven counts of embezzlement. The family reputation was further
tarnished when local newspapers reported a month after the indict-
ment that the judge had once appointed his father inheritance tax
appraiser of a $935,000 estate. 8 For his services, Lodwick Sr. received
a fee, set by his judge-son, of $1,000.
Partly because of Judge Lodwick's estimable local pedigree, the in-
dictinent caused a scandal of some magnitude. For the remainder of
the spring and much of the summer, the case was front-page news in
68. Cf. Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 1.12 (Supp. 1967):
"Trustees, receivers, masters, referees, guardians and persons appointed by a judge
to aid in the administration of justice should be selected with a view solely to their
character and fitness. The power of making such appointments should not be exer-
cised by him for personal or partisan advantage. He should not permit his appoint-
mcnt, to be controlled by others than himself. He should also avoid nepotism and
undue favortism in his appointments" [emphasis added].
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the North Kansas City News-Dispatch (circulation 3,400) and other
local papers. The judge's lawyer indicated he would seek to have the
case tried as soon as possible, and the trial was initially set for June 6,
just three months after the indictment. But in May the judge was
granted a change of venue to another county on the ground that local
prejudice in Clay county would prevent his getting a fair trial. Sub-
sequently the trial was delayed several times again for different reasons,
and to date Judge Lodwick still has not been tried on the embezzlement
charges. He has, however, been tried and convicted in federal court (in
May 1968) of evading payment of federal income taxes on the money
allegedly embezzled.
During the months following the embezzlement indictment, Judge
Lodwick appeared unabashed by his circumstances. On April 28, he
filed his name in the August primary election for Democratic candidate
for probate judge. In Clay county, the Democratic nomination has
always been tantamount to election. The judge's paid political adver-
tisement in local newspapers recited his membership or activities in the
Methodist church, Junior Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club,
Shrine Club, Masonic Lodge, Eastern Star, Elks, United Fund, Boy
Scouts, Red Cross, Clay County Bar Association, and Missouri Histori-
cal Society. The advertisement concluded with a statement of the
judge's view that Clay county needed a probate judge who was "experi-
enced, efficient and progressive and acquainted with the people's prob-
lems."
Other politicians seemed not to share Judge Lodwick's optimism.
Two other candidates had already filed in the primary for the probate
judgeship, one of whom, Keller Bell, had held the office when defeated
by Lodwick in 1962. Two Democrats seeking their party's nomination
for seats in the state legislature publicly rejected the support of local
labor groups in order to avoid having their names appear with Judge
Lodwick's on labor's political literature. As the campaign moved into
mid-summer, local newspapers kept the case stoked up with front-page
news stories and editorials.
In the August primary, the Democratic nomination for probate
judge went to Rollie Baldwin, with 10,358 votes. Of the 18,000 votes
cast, about twice the number usually cast in an off-year primary, Judge
Lodwick received 3,151. He carried eight of 115 precincts. In the gen-
eral elections in November, while Rollie Baldwin ran unopposed,
three of his Democratic running mates were defeated by Republicans.
In a county where no Republican had held any public office in
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over 140 years, two Republicans were elected to the three member
county court (board of supervisors) and a Republican was elected
county prosecuting attorney. The incumbent Democratic county
prosecutor, Gerald Kiser, had disavowed an old friendship with the
Lodwick family and announced he would prosecute the judge. While
1966 was a Republican year nationally as well as in Clay county, Linn
L. Brown, editor of a local newspaper, said "virtually everyone" agreed
that the Democratic debacle was directly attributable to the Lodwick
case.
A month after the November elections, the Internal Revenue Service
began investigation of Judge Lodwick's court records for his term as
magistrate to see whether he had received any taxable but unreported
income as a result of the alleged embezzlement. The IRS investigation
continued for a year. Meanwhile, Judge Lodwick completed his term
as probate judge, which expired January 1, 1967, and his term as vice-
president of the county bar association, which expired in July 1967.
The IRS finished its investigation and presented its evidence to a
grand jury in Kansas City in January 1968, and the next month Lod-
wick was indicted for income tax evasion. It was charged that in 1961
he received $6,750 income that he did not report and consequently
owed an additional $2,526 in taxes. A second count of the indictment
charged that he knowingly signed a false return in 1961. At the close
of a five-day trial in May 1968, the jury deliberated an hour before
returning a verdict of guilty. Lodwick was sentenced to the maximum
imprisonment on each charge, a total of eight years, but the trial judge
can later reduce this on the basis of a sentencing investigation. Lodwick
is presently free on bond pending final disposition of an appeal (his
motion for new trial was overruled August 27, 1968), following which
-assuming affirmance-he will serve three months imprisonment while
the sentencing investigation is made. It is a safe surmise that the eight-
year sentence initially imposed will be substantially reduced.
By one of those curious coincidences of political history, the 1966
general elections were a fateful occasion for the suburbs of St. Louis as
well as for the suburbs of Kansas City. In Clay county (north suburban
Kansas City), Judge Lodwick's malfeasance tainted the Democrats so
badly that they lost three offices to Republicans in a county where no
Republican had ever before been elected to anything. In St. Louis
county (the city's western suburbs), a scandal involving the incumbent
Democratic prosecuting attorney helped Republicans to defeat him as
well as to win every other county office on the ballot except the circuit
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judgeship occupied by Noah Weinstein, a Democrat who ran unopposed
for re-election. Six of Judge Weinstein's incumbent Democratic col-
leagues were defeated. It was the first time that any incumbent judge
had lost a bid for re-election since Poelker, a Democrat, defeated
LaDriere, a Republican, in 1958, a Democratic year in St. Louis county
elections.
Leading the Republican judges in his margin of victory was fifty-four
year old John D. Hasler, who left his Democratic opponent, John B.
Gray, 44,334 votes behind. Eighteen months after taking the oath of
office, Hasler was convicted by a jury of "oppression, partiality, mis-
conduct, and abuse of authority" as a result of his personal involvement
with a woman divorce defendant in his court.
Sometime in October 1967, after the first hearing in the divorce
proceedings between Delmar Shelby and Jean Poole Shelby, Judge
Hasler and Mrs. Shelby had dinner together. Subsequently, the judge
saw Mrs. Shelby socially on other occasions, including several times
after December 5, when he heard evidence (including testimony by
Mrs. Shelby) and took the divorce case under advisement. Testimony at
the judge's misconduct trial indicated that he had written her "close to
fifteen" letters 9 and placed several personal phone calls to her. The
meetings and correspondence had romantic overtones,70 but also in-
volved discussion of the divorce proceedings, depositions, and testimony
Mrs. Shelby had given or was to give.71 The relationship between the
judge and Mrs. Shelby was apparently not known to either Mr. Shelby
or his lawyer.72
Early in February, Mr. Shelby discovered five of the judge's letters to
Mrs. Shelby. A few days later, Mr. Shelby's lawyer, Theodore Schechter,
moved Judge Hasler to disqualify himself from the case. The judge
did so and the case was transferred out of his court on February 7.
69. Testimony of Jean Shelby before the Circuit Court, July 8, 1968.
70. Deposition of Jean Shelby on behalf of the defendant, May 17, 1968.
71. Id.
72. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 1.17 (Supp. 1967): "A judge should not permit private interviews,
arguments or communications designed to influence his judicial action, where interests
to be affected thereby are not represented before him .. " and Mo. Sup. CT. R. 1.13
(Supp. 1967): "A judge should not .. .suffer his conduct to justify the impression that
any person can improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor ...." and Mo. Sup.
CT. R. 1.04 (Supp. 1967): "A judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety.., and his personal behavior, not only upon the Bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in everyday life, should be beyond
reproach."
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Meanwhile Schechter sent copies of the five letters to the local profes-
sional ethics committee of the state bar association.
On Friday, March 1, the story of Judge Hasler's personal involvement
in the Shelby divorce case broke in local newspapers, with a page one
article in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch headlined "Bar Studying Judge's
Role in Divorce Case." The following Monday, Judge Hasler's fourteen
colleagues on the St. Louis County Circuit Court met en banc and
agreed not to assign any more cases to him. Tuesday, the majority
leader in the Missouri House of Representatives, Richard J. Rabbitt
(D-St. Louis), introduced a resolution to create a legislative committee
that would investigate the judge's conduct and recommend whether
he should be impeached. Wednesday, Gene McNary, St. Louis county
prosecuting attorney, announced that the county grand jury would be
asked to investigate the case. Thursday, the Rabbitt resolution passed
the House, 102-31.73
On March 21, after two days of hearing, the grand jury returned an
indictment charging Judge Hasler with violation of the state's oppres-
sion in office statute, which provides: 74
Every person exercising or holding any office of public trust who
shall be guilty of willful and malicious oppression, partiality, mis-
conduct or abuse of authority in his official capacity or under color
of his office, shall, on conviction, be deemed guilty of a mis-
demeanor.
A few days after the indictment, the St. Louis County Circuit Court
met en banc again regarding Judge Hasler, this time relieving him of
all official duties.
The judge's trial began three and a half months later on July 8. The
evidence most relied upon by the state was Judge Hasler's letters to
Mrs. Shelby. His letter of January 18 shows most clearly his personal
involvement in the case. It begins with the salutation "Dearest" and
includes the following passages:
There is still more I want to tell you and discuss carefully about
the way I should like to order this decree. You see I not only
want but need that extra testimony in the record to help with
the order of custody. What I most regret is that G.G. [Granville
73. Under an impeachment procedure apparently peculiar to Missouri, the trial is
before the state supreme court rather than the upper chamber of the legislature. Mo.
CONST. art. VII, § 2.
74. Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.110 (1959).
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Gamblin, Mrs. Shelby's lawyer] has not brought up the Motion
for Temporary Alimony and Child Support while all this is pend-
ing, then I could have ordered it and we would not be in any
great hurry, for your parents would then be receiving weekly
whatever amount I should have ordered for that purpose that he
[Mr. Shelby] be directed to pay from his earnings.
This way, more delay is just pushing that off into the future
and is not at all helpful to your parents or to you and isn't a whit
fair. And good old D. [Delmar, i.e., Mr. Shelby] is just laughing
up his sleeve. I am planning to call G.G. into my office and talk
to him straight from the shoulder about the way I think he should
proceed from this point on. I hope he will. I feel that he most
likely will ....
Now, for me, read this, re-read it if need be, but you and I know
it were best that you destroy this writing now, please. For your
own sake (not mine) we cannot suffer comment about the "case"
ever to run the risk beforehand, to fall into the wrong hands. It
is too, too dangerous ....
Here are copies of the very nice letters from Mrs. Pennington
[a social worker assigned to the Shelby case]. I showed them to
Schechter [Theodore Schechter, Mr. Shelby's lawyer] and he said,
"Who are they talking about? I don't recognize the person they're
describing here as a good mother, responsible and competentl" I
could have hit his sneering face, but I had to hold my temper for
I cannot in any way let the slightest thing show that I am interested
personally in anything going on for either side. I am certain you
understand that this is in your highest interest and that of the
children.
In her testimony for the state, Mrs. Shelby said she thought she had
the judge in her "female clutches"; that he had written her about
fifteen letters after they first met in court; and that he had once taken
pictures of her showing a black eye caused by a beating by her husband;
and that the pictures were to be used as evidence in the divorce pro.
ceedings. On cross-examination, substantial doubt was raised about
Mrs. Shelby's credibility.
On the third day of trial, Judge Hasler himself took the witness
stand. He denied some particulars of Mrs. Shelby's testimony, but did
not deny the substance of the prosecution's case, which was his course
of conduct in seeing her socially and discussing the divorce proceedings
with her by letter and telephone. The theory of his defense was that
his relations with Mrs. Shelby were "paternalistic" and arose from
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sympathy for her and her children. He denied misusing his official
position to help her.75
The purpose of his first meeting with her, the judge testified, was to
confront Mrs. Shelby "eye to eye" about Mr. Shelby's allegations of her
adultery. The judge denied having sexual relations with Mrs. Shelby
(there was no evidence to contradict this), and said he was not romantic-
ally involved with her. Regarding his use of the salutation "Dearest"
in his letters to Mrs. Shelby, the judge said that he ascribed no particu-
lar significance to the word.
After a five-day trial, the jury of six men and six women began
deliberations shortly before six p.m. Friday, July 12. After several hours,
no verdict had been reached, and deliberations were resumed Saturday
morning. That afternoon the jury returned a verdict of guilty and
assessed the judge's punishment at a $1.00 fine. Maximum punishment
for the offense is one year in jail, a $500 fine, or both.
Contemporaneously with the criminal proceedings against Judge
Hasler by the county prosecutor's office, the Missouri House of Repre-
sentatives conducted its own investigation to determine whether the
judge should be impeached. (Under present law, a Missouri judge can
be removed from office only by conviction on articles of impeachment;
Judge Hasler's misdemeanor conviction did not itself disqualify him
from office.) The resolution to create an investigating committee was
passed March 7. The committee's hearings began April 9 and its report
recommending impeachment was submitted May 14. After meeting as a
committee of the whole to hear evidence, the House, meeting in its
second special session, voted four articles of impeachment against
Judge Hasler on June 28.
The articles charged 6 that Judge Hasler "did improperly advise and
counsel with Jean Shelby ... concerning the testimony" she was to give
in the divorce case; that he made improper "suggestions to Jean Shelby
and her attorney as to what action they should take to secure a favor-
able ruling" from him; that "with intent to hear and secure additional
evidence in order that he might make decisions therein personally
compatible to him and in support of which no evidence had been
adduced and in order that his predetermined decision in the case would
be less susceptible to reversal on appeal," he improperly reopened the
Shelby case after it had been submitted to him for decision; and that
his conduct "brought disrepute to his high office." Each of the four
75, Testimony of Judge Hasler before the Circuit Court, July 10, 1968.
76. H I. OF Mo., 74th Gen. Assembly, 2d Extra Sess., at 34-42.
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articles was voted on separately, and all passed by an overwhelming
margin.
B. Conclusion
Each of the three cases described above was resolved by a very dif-
ferent course of actions and events. Thus we can say that one striking
thing about Missouri's response to the problem of judicial misconduct
is its reactive, ad hoc character. It is the coincidence of events which
seems to dictate the response in a particular case, rather than any
conscious effort to implement a regularized procedure.
What other conclusion can we draw, for example, from the fact that
it took eighteen months after initial public disclosure of his misconduct
to begin impeachment proceedings against Judge Poelker but only six
days to do so against Judge Hasler? The legislature can answer that
it was not in session and therefore could not act when the full extent
of Poelker's misconduct became known in the fall of 1961 and the
winter of 1962. But should the resolving of misconduct charges against
a judge be subject to such contingencies as whether the legislature
happens to be in session?
Or take the Lodwick case. What if Judge Lodwick had been in the
first year of his four-year term instead of the last? It is likely that the
legislature would have had another impeachment proceeding on its
hands. As it happened, the legislature was not in session when the
embezzlement indictment was returned in March 1966 and therefore
could not be charged with the responsibility to act immediately. The
consequence was that Judge Lodwick, even though defeated in the
August 1966 primary, stayed in office under a cloud of suspicion about
his integrity until January 1, 1967 when his term ended, ten months
after the indictment.
The point of these observations is that Missouri's response to the
problem of judicial misconduct is very much a function of the circum-
stances prevailing at the time the particular case arises. There is no
assurance therefore that each case will be treated with the procedural
regularity to which the subject judge is entitled as a matter of due
process, or with the expeditiousness necessary to minimize loss of
public confidence in the judiciary and in the legal system's capacity
to respond to internal malfunctioning. The fault of the present arrange.
ment is not that it is ineffective, since in all three cases the judge's
service was eventually terminated, but that like Missouri's mechanism
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for disability retirement, it is procedurally clumsy, high in social cost,
and therefore inefficient.
To provide a fully adequate response to the problem of judicial
misconduct, a court system must include not only an effective removal
procedure but also a number of features that are presently lacking in
Missouri. One such feature would be a mechanism for monitoring those
areas of a judge's official performance where misconduct might occur.
We are entitled to ask, for example, how it happened that Judge Lod-
wick's embezzlement of court funds in 1961 went undiscovered until
1966. His activities would certainly have come to light much earlier if
there were a provision in Missouri for periodic audit of court records
involving the receipt of fines and other moneys. New Jersey, which
seems to be one of the few states that do such audits, has on at least one
occasion discovered by this means that a judge was guilty of "irregulari-
ties" in processing traffic tickets. 77
Similarly, Judge Hasler's relationship with Mrs. Shelby might have
been discovered earlier if there were closer scrutiny of the status of
court calendars. Nine months elapsed from the time Mr. Shelby filed
suit for divorce in May 1967 to the time his lawyer discovered the
judge's personal involvement with Mrs. Shelby. Most contested divorces
do not take that long to reach final decision. While the normal stop-
and-go pace of litigation would account for part of this time, some of
the delay was apparently attributable to Judge Hasler's efforts to main-
tain his relationship with Mrs. Shelby by not making a final decision in
the case. A weekly or monthly statistical report, such as that required
by court rule in New Jersey,78 showing cases decided, cases pending, and
cases under advisement (and for how long) would have shown up the
unusual delay in the Shelby case. Subsequent inquiry might have
revealed the judge's indiscretion before he had become so deeply in-
volved. (Delay attributable to other, more usual causes, such as illness
or disability, would also be manifest from periodic statistical reports.)
Administrative devices such as audits of court financial records and
statistical reports on court calendars are not much mentioned in the
literature on removal of judges for misconduct. The foregoing specula-
tions about the Lodwick and Hasler cases should make dear, however,
that business-like administration is an indispensable part of a court
system's apparatus for dealing effectively with the problem of miscon-
duct, and with disability too for that matter. In general, the better the
77. See N.J. CT. R. 8:13-9, 8:13-10 and In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 168 A.2d 38 (1961).
78. N.J. Cr. R. 1:30-5.
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administrative structure of a court system, the easier it will be to detect
malfunctions in the system which result from a judge's unwillingness
or inability to do a decent job.
Effective administration can also help facilitate discipline for minor
misconduct: the judge who is habitually late to court, takes off on
Friday afternoon (or all day), goes on long vacations, is abusive to
persons appearing in court, participates in partisan politics, etc. Such
problems can often be detected by administrative devices and remedied
internally in the system by informal, low-intensity sanctions such as a
suggestive letter, used, for example, in California.79
Administrative devices may not detect, however, those kinds of mis-
conduct which do not have manifest symptoms or cannot be easily
checked. Examples are bribery, drinking, favoritism in appointments,
and accepting gifts and favors from lawyers. Consequently, even with
the best administration, the need for a removal procedure remains.
Missouri's only formal removal procedure at present is impeachment.
That procedure has the following specific deficiencies.
(1) The use of impeachment in Missouri depends upon the legislature
(which meets only biennially) being in session. We have seen in the
Poelker case the delay that can result when this condition is not met.
Similar delay was avoided in the Hasler case only because of the
coincidence that the legislature was in session when the judge's mis-
conduct was disclosed.
(2) Impeachment is entirely reactive in its character. Public scandal,
rather than legislative initiative, is the trigger mechanism. The legisla-
ture will act only when sufficient political pressure has been generated
by public disclosure of the misconduct-although the reaction time
may be as long as eighteen months (Poelker) or as short as six days
(Hasler). (It is a reasonable surmise that the legislature's quick response
to the Hasler case was at least partly motivated by its desire to avoid
repetition of the severe public criticism it received because of the
delay in the Poelker case.)
(8) Impeachment is an ad hoc device, and this means there are no
regularized rules of procedure and no permanent staff. Without such
rules, there is no assurance of procedural equal protection for the
subject judge. Without a permanent staff, impeachment cannot monitor
possible problem areas of judicial performance and conduct. It is a
removal procedure, nothing more nor less. Once impeached, a judge
79. Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 Tax. L. Rlv. 1117, 1128, 1131-32 (1966).
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either resigns under threat of trial (removal by indirection) or is tried.
If tried, he is removed or acquitted. No other options are open, such as
discipline for an offense not warranting removal.
(4) Impeachment is procedurally clumsy. A grand jury-the function
of Missouri's lower legislative house-with 163 members is absurd.
Moreover, every step of the proceedings must be taken by motion or
resolution and voted on by the legislature. The sequence of legislative
action in the Poelker case is indicated in the footnote.80 Legislative
action in the Hasler case was much more abbreviated, comprising only
three resolutions and the vote on each of four articles of impeachment.
While the Hasler case thus indicates that impeachment can be made
more expeditious, the very fact of different handling of the two cases
evidences the absence of such procedural regularity as will insure due
process to the subject judge, a deficiency already referred to.
(5) Impeachment, because it is a legislative proceeding, is intrinsically
partisan, in the sense of involving party politics. Legislators are partisan
advocates by civic obligation and practical necessity; of all groups,
therefore, who might be given authority to judge the judges, legislators
are uniquely disqualified by the habits of their occupation. Even for
the most statesmanlike of them, it is difficult in an impeachment pro-
ceeding to ignore partisan considerations.
Some circumstantial evidence of partisanship can be found in both
the Poelker and Hasler proceedings.8' But the case against impeachment
80. Resolution to appoint two lawyers to investigate and then present evidence to a
Committee of the Whole House; appointment of the lawyers by the Speaker; motion to
adopt the report of the Committee of the Whole House; resolution to appoint a special
committee to draw up the articles of impeachment; appointment of the special committee
by the Speaker; recommendation of the special committee for adoption of twenty-one
articles; separate vote on each article (seventeen were adopted); motion to transmit the
adopted articles to the state supreme court for trial and to appoint two members of the
House as managers (prosecutors) of the case before the court; resolution to reimburse
the managers for expenses and allow reasonable fees for their services.
81. One piece of such evidence is a comparison of the votes of some individuals who
voted in the impeachment of both Poelker and Hasler. For example, House majority
leader Richard J. Rabbitt (D-St. Louis) voted "aye" on all four articles of impeachment
proposed against Judge Hasler, a Republican. In the proceedings against Judge Poelker,
a Democrat, twenty-one articles were proposed and seventeen adopted, all but three by
margins of o~er seventy votes (the house has 163 members). Rabbitt voted "aye" on only
five articles. These facts are suggestive of the possibility that Representative Rabbitt
was unable to be wholly objective in evaluating the alleged misconduct of a judge in his
own party.
Another piece of evidence is the contrast between the percentages of each party who
voted "aye" and "no" on the resolution to investigate Judge Hasler's conduct (similar
statistics for the Poelker case are not immediately available). Ninety-one of the 107
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because of its intrinsically partisan nature does not rest only upon the
argument that circumstantial evidence of partisanship can be found
in the Poelker and Hasler proceedings. The basic and broader objec-
tion is that the partisan character of a legislature makes it ipso facto an
inappropriate forum to try charges of judicial misconduct, even if
specific prejudice cannot be shown in a particular case. It is incongruous
and absurd that an ordinary citizen accused of crime has a constitution-
ally guaranteed right to an impartial jury while a judge can be indicted
for misconduct by a group of persons whose professional interests, not
to say obligations, make it quite likely that they will be unable to view
his case with detachment.
(6) Impeachment is costly. The direct cost of the Poelker impeach-
ment was $15,864. Additionally, the state paid Judge Poelker $31,000
in salary over a period of one year and seven months during which he
heard not one case. These two figures total nearly $47,000, but Missouri
got off cheaply even at this price if the figures available for comparison
are any guide. Florida, for example, has had two impeachments in the
last decade. One in 1957 cost $121,869.77. One in 1963 cost $79,742.39
plus approximately $35,000 for printing the 2600 pages of testimony
and other proceedings which occupied twelve days.82
As for the Hasler impeachment, no figures on its direct cost to the
state have been made public. The expeditiousness of the proceedings
makes it appear that their cost was negligible compared to the Poelker
case. But an accurate account of the cost of the Hasler impeachment
must include reference to the fact that the Missouri legislature was in
its second special session when most of the proceedings occurred. Dur-
ing the pendency of the Hasler case, the governor remarked that a
second special session would cost the state "about $300,000. ' 83 Whether
Democrats in the Missouri House voted on the resolution; eighty-one voted "aye," seven
"no," and three "present." In contrast to this united Democratic front, the Republicans
split almost evenly. Fifty-four of the fifty-six Republicans were present and voting-
twenty-one voted "aye," twenty-four "no," and nine "present." These facts are suggestive
of the possibility that the Republicans were unable to be wholly objective in evaluating
the alleged misconduct of a judge of their own party.
Much more evidence than these two items would be needed, of course, to demonstrate
that the proceedings in either impeachment were so tainted by partisanship that in-
justice was done. Both judges very likely deserved to be impeached; the evidence against
them was substantial, and the vote on the articles was overwhelmingly affirmative in
both proceedings.
82. These figures originated in the Florida state comptroller's office and are stated in
a letter, quoted here with permission, from the then chief justice of the state supreme
court, E. Harris Drew, to Hampton Dunn, a St. Petersburg newspaperman, Jan. 1, 1964.
83. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Mar. 6, 1968, at 1, col. 4.
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the actual cost was in fact $300,000, or only half that, it would be wrong
to count all of it as a cost of the Hasler case, since as it turned out, there
were other reasons for calling the second special session, such as action
on an urgent capital improvements bill.
But suppose the House investigating committee's impeachment
recommendation had been the only item on the legislative calendar
for a second special session. The governor would have faced a dilemma:
should he call the session, at substantial cost to the state, just to act on
the impeachment recommendation? or should he allow Judge Hasler,
suspended from duty by his colleagues and convicted by a jury of of-
ficial misconduct, to remain in office under a cloud of suspicions about
his fitness until the next regular session, seven months away in Jan-
uary 1966? By the fact of having other legitimate reasons to call the
session, the governor was able to avoid confronting this vexing choice-
another example of the way in which the coincidence of circumstances
rather than intelligent planning dictates Missouri's response to the
problem of judicial misconduct.
But if not impeachment, what else in its place? The answer to this
question depends upon what we conceive to be the operational objec-
tives of a removal-discipline procedure. The following are proposed:
(1) To identify problems of judicial misconduct by monitoring the
performance and conduct of judges to the extent possible and appro-
priate within the tradition of judicial independence properly under-
stood;
(2) To investigate promptly and impartially all allegations and evi-
dence of such misconduct;
(3) To give the subject judge notice and opportunity to be heard in
all cases; and in cases where the charges, if proved, would justify re-
moval or any lesser sanction of a punitive nature, to afford him all the
procedural protections applicable in a criminal proceeding;
(4) Where misconduct is proved, to correct, discipline, or remove the
offending judge, according to the nature and seriousness of the offense.
(As a matter of policy, though not of operational planning, it should
also be the function of the procedure to protect, and where necessary,
to vindicate publicly, the reputation and integrity of the judiciary
when allegations of misconduct prove groundless.)
Some agency must be identified as having responsibility to accom-
plish these objectives and vested with power to that end. The responsi-
ble agency in the case of impeachment is the legislature, but for reasons
already stated, a legislature is unable to utilize its power in this area
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either effectively or efficiently. Politically and practically, the only
alternative to the legislature is an agency within the judicial establish-
ment itself. The particular membership of the agency is not important
-with one qualification: the majority must be judges, since they them-
selves will certainly not accept any other balance of power. The agency
can be the state supreme court,8 4 a specially constituted court,", a com-
mission of judges, 6 or a commission of judges, lawyers and laymen.,7
The necessity for monitoring judicial conduct and performance in
order to detect misconduct has been discussed earlier. Whether the
removal-discipline agency performs the monitoring function directly
and independently or relies upon procedures already established will
be determined by the internal politics of the judiciary in the particular
jurisdiction and the degree and efficacy of existing administrative-
managerial organization in the court system. None of the removal-
discipline agencies being studied during this research perform directly
any significant monitoring function; all utilize the existing administra-
tive structure and procedures."8
Some misconduct will be reported by sources outside the agency,
however, and thus its effectiveness hinges partly upon its being visible
and accessible to potential complainants. Accessibility means there
should be no unnecessary formalities to initiating a complaint; a letter
or phone call, even if anonymous, should be acceptable. Besides an
attitude of receptivity on the part of the agency, another policy that
will facilitate complaints is confidentiality. Three considerations sup.
port the policy of keeping confidential, at least initially, both the names
of the complainant and the subject-judge, and the nature of the com-
plaint. First, many lawyers are reluctant to complain; they feel (whether
84. See, e.g., NJ. CoNsr. art. VI, § 2, 3; § 6, 4.
85. E.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22.
86. E.g., ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 18.
87. E.g., CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 8.
88. Five states are being studied. In Missouri, there is only moderate administrative
organization and control in the court system. Hence judicial performance and conduct
are not monitored very closely, and even then not with the direct or incidental purpose
of detecting misconduct. In New Jersey, the supreme court has administrative authority
over the court system and is also the removal-discipline agency. Thus, both administra-
tion and investigation of alleged misconduct are handled by the administrative director
of the courts. The arrangements in Illinois and the appellate divisions of the first and
second judicial departments in New York City are roughly similar. In California, the
supreme court has the final power of sanction in removal-discipline cases, but the leg-
work is done by the executive secretary of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
who has established a dose, day-to-day working relationship with the administrative
office of courts.
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justifiably is not the point) that if the judge stays in office and word gets
back to him, they and their clients' interests will suffer somehow. The
confidentiality policy can help lessen this anxiety. Second, confidentiality
may help encourage a consensual response from the subject judge in
cases where the misconduct is proved but where it is appropriate to
allow him to resign rather than face proceedings (e.g., alcoholism).
Third, in cases where the complaint proves without merit, the con-
fidentiality policy helps insure that the reputations of the subject judge
and the judiciary as a whole are not needlessly tarnished by public
disclosure of groundless accusations.
The procedural powers of the agency should be adequate to the
scope of its jurisdiction and must include at a minimum the power to
conduct investigations, call witnesses, subpoena evidence, and have
access to court records. If the agency has jurisdiction to retire for
disability as well as to remove or discipline for misconduct, it should
also have the power to order a physical or mental examination of a
judge. And once a complaint is found to have prima facie validity, the
agency should have power to suspend the subject judge from duty
pending a final determination on the merits.
The inflexibility of sanction which is a principal weakness of impeach-
ment should be avoided by giving the agency the power to adapt its
disciplinary action to the character of the offense. In the jurisdictions
being studied during this research, at least four different sanctions
less than removal have been used: a letter to the subject judge,8 9 which,
according to its tone, can be instructional or correctional; an admoni-
tion or a reprimand; private censure by a judge senior in rank;90 and
public censure91 or reprimand9,2 by the state supreme court.
Staffing the agency is crucial. Inadequate staffing--or what is much
the same thing, inadequate financing-can incapacitate the agency even
if it is otherwise equipped to do its job. As a practical matter, staffing
can be provided in one or a combination of various ways. If the size
of the jurisdiction and the expected agency workload warrant it, a
full-time salaried position can be created. This is the arrangement in
California, where a full-time executive secretary does the daily legwork
89. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Hearings on Procedures for the Removal, Retirement, and Disciplining of Un-
fit Federal Judges Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 141 (1966) (testimony of Honor-
able George J. Beldock, presiding justice, Second Judicial Dep't, State of New York).
91. In re Klaisz, 19 N.J. 145, 115 A2d 537 (1955).
92. In re Pagliughi, 39 N.J. 517, 189 A.2d 218 (1963).
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of the Commission on Judicial Qualifications; on occasion, he uses
outside personnel to help in the investigative work. For the state that
can afford such an operation, the full-time one-man staff '(or more, if
necessary), with supporting secretarial service, seems far the best ar-
rangement.
Second, if the administrative office of the court system also handles
judicial disciplinary matters, as in New Jersey, the staff of that office
can be used for administrative and investigative work in misconduct
cases. This is an economical arrangement, since it utilizes existing
resources. The principal disadvantage is that it can divert those re-
sources from their intended use; if very many misconduct cases arise,
a decision must be made whether court administration or judicial
discipline is to take precedence.
A third possibility is to appoint a referee to hold hearings and make
findings of fact on the basis of which the agency will decide whether
disciplinary action is justified. This arrangement has been used at times
in both New York and New Jersey. Somewhat analogous is the appoint-
ment of a legislative committee to investigate and make fact-findings,
as in the Poelker and Hasler impeachment cases. Yet another possibility
is to hire a private investigator on a case-by-case basis.
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